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I. INTRODUCTION 
Thus this court, at last, made the circuit, and the stone which the builders 
rejected again became the head of the corner.  By that change all its utterances 
inconsistent with the points so necessarily decided by the united court, 
November 17, 1855, became from thenceforth as mere dicta.  But is it quite 
clear that the decision in M. & M. R. Co. v. Waukesha was contrary to sound 
reason, and to be sustained only upon the maxim stare decisis?1 
Justice John B. Cassoday, 1881 
 
When the Milwaukee Lawyers Chapter of the Federalist Society held its 
25th Anniversary Panel and Dinner in 2017, the Chapter’s former presidents 
were asked what emerging issues Wisconsin law would confront in the next 
twenty-five years.  Justice Rebecca Bradley, one of two former Chapter 
presidents now serving on the Wisconsin Supreme Court, identified the court’s 
 
* This Article does not necessarily represent the positions of any of Suhr’s or LeRoy’s current or 
former employers.  Any information about cases that either author participated in is drawn from court 
opinions or public filings only. 
1. Wis. Cent. R.R. Co. v. Taylor County, 52 Wis. 37, 76–77, 8 N.W. 833, 846 (1881). 
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approach to precedent as a key issue.  She suggested that once Wisconsin jurists 
began applying textualism and originalism to long-standing doctrines in 
Wisconsin law, they may discover substantial gaps between the law as written 
and the law as interpreted—necessarily raising the question of stare decisis.  We 
agree with Justice Bradley that this question will be critical for the Wisconsin 
Supreme Court in the coming decades; nevertheless, as Justice Cassoday’s 
opinion quoted above shows, it is a version of a question almost as old as the 
state high court itself.2 
Stare decisis, to stand by things decided, is an ancient legal principle that 
dates back to the earliest days of English common law.3  The U.S. Supreme 
Court has developed its own version of the doctrine, although most of the 
justices of that court carry their own idiosyncrasies on the matter.4  Similarly, 
the Wisconsin Supreme Court has a series of cases stretching back to its 
beginning defining the power of precedent5—and, like the U.S. Supreme Court, 
each of Wisconsin’s supreme court justices has his or her own unique, 
considered views on the topic. 
We have both descriptive and normative goals for this Article.  First, 
descriptively, we collect relevant stare decisis cases and synthesize the 
Wisconsin court’s modern-day test, which finds its foundation in 2003’s 
Johnson Controls decision (as a backdrop, we also detail the U.S. Supreme 
Court’s approach).6  We then use the Wisconsin Supreme Court’s approach to 
stare decisis to frame our discussion of the doctrine of precedent.7  Our concern 
is simple: the doctrine of stare decisis results in near-limitless judicial discretion 
that is individualized to each judge.  Importantly, we think this undesirable 
result flows from the nature of the doctrine itself, not from judicial malfeasance 
or misfeasance.   
For our normative goals, we offer two new ways to conceive of stare 
decisis, both of which reduce the doctrine’s undesirable unpredictability in a 
 
2. In fact, even as early as 1859 the court would state, “[s]tare decisis is the motto of the courts 
of justice.” Ableman v. Booth, 11 Wis. 517, 541 (1859); see also Lonstorf v. Lonstorf, 118 Wis. 159, 
163, 95 N.W. 961, 963 (1903). 
3. Thomas Burns, The Doctrine of Stare Decisis (1893) (unpublished B.L. thesis, Cornell 
University) (on file with Cornell Law School, Historical Theses and Dissertations Collection). 
4. See Randy J. Kozel, Stare Decisis as Judicial Doctrine, 67 WASH. & LEE L. REV. 411, 412–
413 (2010). 
5. See, e.g., Wis. Cent. R.R. Co. v. Taylor County, 52 Wis. 37, 76–77, 8 N.W. 833, 846 (1881); 
Johnson Controls, Inc. v. Emp’rs Ins. of Wausau, 2003 WI 108, 264 Wis. 2d 60, 665 N.W.2d 257; 
State v. Denny, 2017 WI 17, 373 Wis. 2d 390, 891 N.W.2d 144. 
6. Johnson Controls, 2003 WI 108, ¶¶ 94–100. 
7. In April 2018, Judge Rebecca Dalett won election to the seat on the Wisconsin Supreme Court 
opened by Justice Michael Gableman’s retirement.  Since Justice Dalett has not yet written on stare 
decisis as a member of the Wisconsin Supreme Court, this Article does not include her approach.  
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class of cases.  First, we propose that stare decisis should operate differently in 
some respects in a judicial system with publicly elected judges, like 
Wisconsin’s, as opposed to a system with appointed judges, like the federal 
system.  Specifically, we argue that the weight of stare decisis ascribed to a 
particular decision should vary based on public opinion, as that opinion is 
expressed in watershed judicial elections.  This does not mean that elected 
judges are absolutely justified in overturning what may be unpopular precedent.  
Rather, this theory means elected judges have more justification to reconsider 
anew such opinions when the voters have disclaimed them.  If the unpopular 
judicial decision is correct on the merits—if the elected judge is independently 
persuaded that the opinion is a correct statement of law—then the judicial oath 
would require that judge to affirm the precedent. 
Second, we offer a new way of thinking about originalist issues as questions 
of first impression, such that stare decisis does not apply to these arguments, 
even if there are previous decisions governing the same area of law.  As we saw 
recently in Tetra Tech EC, Inc. v. Wisconsin Department of Revenue, where the 
Wisconsin Supreme Court declared its agency-deference doctrine 
unconstitutional, the court’s majority is willing to abandon decades-old 
doctrines that conflict with originalist readings of the constitution.8  Justice 
Kelly’s lead opinion very quickly dismissed the argument that its approach 
disrespected stare decisis by concluding that the question at issue (“Does 
agency deference comport with the original understanding of the 
constitution?”) was actually one of “first impression.”9  While countless 
decisions over the course of decades had defined and applied the agency-
deference doctrine, none from the Wisconsin Supreme Court actually analyzed 
the constitutionality of that doctrine.10  Thus, Justice Kelly’s opinion seemingly 
treated this precedent as having significantly less stare decisis effect, devoting 
only a few short paragraphs to justify the case’s significant break from 
precedent.  In this sense, Justice Kelly’s lead opinion simply restated a legal 
truism: on questions of first impression there is no precedent to follow, and thus 
no stare decisis concerns. 
We believe many Wisconsin Supreme Court doctrines and many clauses of 
the Wisconsin Constitution have never been analyzed through an originalist 
lens before.  In our view, should the Wisconsin Supreme Court conduct an 
 
8. 2018 WI 75, ¶ 42, 382 Wis. 2d 496, 914 N.W.2d 21 (2018). 
9. Id. ¶ 42. 
10. E.g., Racine Harley–Davidson, Inc. v. Wis. Div. of Hearing & Appeals, 2006 WI 86, 292 
Wis. 2d 549, 717 N.W.2d 184; Harnischfeger Corp. v. Labor & Indus. Review Comm’n, 196 Wis. 2d 
650, 539 N.W.2d 98 (1995); Harrington v. Smith, 28 Wis. 43 (1871). 
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originalist analysis on those questions of “first impression” and conclude that 
the court’s prior precedent on these topics is legally incorrect, the court is 
justified in overturning that precedent without any need to engage in traditional 
stare decisis analysis. 
The Wisconsin legal landscape is in a period of change—a change that, at 
least at this stage, appears to be towards textualism and originalism.11  This 
evolution is often precipitated by institutional litigants.  The Wisconsin 
Department of Justice—and in particular through the former Office of the 
Solicitor General—has confronted numerous bedrock Wisconsin legal issues, 
from deference to agencies (already mentioned above), to the power of 
Wisconsin executive officers, to tort-reform.12  Sometimes the Department of 
Justice calls for overturning precedent, even if longstanding.13  Additionally, 
the Wisconsin Institute for Law & Liberty is increasingly bringing cases that 
seek to overturn precedent or challenge historical interpretations of state 
constitutional doctrines like substantive due process.14  Other scholars and 
litigants are calling for the court to rethink the constitutional foundations of the 
Public Trust Doctrine.15  And the court itself is responsible for prompting some 
of this change: in Tetra Tech, the court—not the parties—first introduced the 
 
11. See for example Gabler v. Crime Victims Rights Board, 2017 WI 67, ¶ 2, 376 Wis. 2d 147, 
897 N.W.2d 384, wherein the court took an originalist and textualist approach to the separation-of-
powers doctrine in a decision that could perhaps be perceived as politically unpopular, ruling as it did 
against the Crime Victims Rights Board. 
12. Tetra Tech, 2018 WI 75, ¶ 43; Koschkee v. Evers, 2018 WI 82, ¶¶ 1–2, 382 Wis. 2d 666, 913 
N.W.2d 878; Mayo v. Wis. Injured Patients & Families Comp. Fund, 2018 WI 78, ¶ 1, 383 Wis. 2d 1, 
914 N.W.2d 678. 
13. See, e.g., Tetra Tech, 2018 WI 75, ¶ 3 (briefing by the Solicitor General’s Office calls for 
overturning long-standing doctrine of agency deference); Mayo, 2018 WI 78, ¶ 2; State v. Denny, 2017 
WI 17, ¶¶ 122–29, 373 Wis. 2d 390, 891 N.W.2d 144; see also State v. Lynch, 2016 WI 66, ¶ 4, 371 
Wis. 2d 1, 885 N.W.2d 89 (relaying that the Department of Justice, though not through the SG’s office, 
calls for overturning a 14-year-old precedent). 
14. Amicus brief by WILL in Coyne v. Walker, 2016 WI 38, 368 Wis. 2d 444, 879 N.W.2d 520, 
straightforwardly asks the Court to overrule Thompson v. Craney, 199 Wis. 2d 674, 546 N.W.2d 123 
(1996). Amici Curiae Brief of the Honorable Jason Fields, Honorable Scott Jensen, and the Wis. Inst. 
for Law & Liberty, Coyne v. Walker, 2016 WI 38, 368 Wis. 2d 444, 879 N.W.2d 520 (No. 11-CV-
4573), https://acefiling.wicourts.gov/documents/show_any_doc?appId=wscca&docSource=EFile&p
%5bcaseNo%5d=2013AP000416&p%5bdocId%5d=100282&p%5beventSeqNo%5d=22&p%5bsecti
onNo%5d=1 [https://perma.cc/V2KE-AXZH]; see Porter v. State, 2018 WI 79, ¶¶ 12, 55, 382 Wis. 2d 
697, 913 N.W.2d 842 (WILL advocates an expansive reading of the substantive due process clause to 
embrace a right to earn a living). 
15. See, e.g., Andrew C. Cook, New Limits on the Public Trust Doctrine, WIS. L.J. (Nov. 29, 
2013), http://wislawjournal.com/2013/11/29/new-limits-on-the-public-trust-doctrine/ 
[https://perma.cc/23R7-LMFF]. 
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question of whether Wisconsin’s longstanding deference regime should be 
abandoned.16 
Wisconsin’s changing legal landscape correlates with broader national 
movements.  Conservative intellectuals and lawyers, that is, those most likely 
to advocate for originalism and textualism, have moved away from unflinching 
deference to precedent17 and towards a rediscovery of original meaning, 
including for state constitutional provisions that lack a federal analogue—a sort 
of new-federalism for conservatives.18  Additionally, the U.S. Supreme Court’s 
October Term 2017 had some high-profile stare decisis cases,19 and the October 
Term 2018 appears to have such cases as well.20  Perhaps this is a sign of things 
to come in that court.  Further, some have called for an abandonment of stare 
decisis altogether in constitutional cases,21 something even Justice Thomas has 
hinted at.22 
 
16. Philip C. Babler, Will this Term of Wisconsin’s Supreme Court Be the Last for Agency 
Deference in Wisconsin?, FOLEY & LARDNER (Sept. 11, 2017), 
https://www.wiappellatelaw.com/2017/09/11/will-this-term-of-wisconsins-supreme-court-be-the-last-
for-agency-deference-in-wisconsin/ [https://perma.cc/EVW8-7GFR] (noting that it was the court’s 
briefing order which brought forth the deference issue in Tetra Tech).  
17. See Adam Liptak, Thomas Is Getting a New Chance to Break Precedent (if Not Silence), 
N.Y. TIMES (Feb. 24, 2014), https://www.nytimes.com/2014/02/25/us/another-test-of-precedent-no-
not-thomass-silence.html [https://perma.cc/3SYH-QXK2].  
18. Compare Clint Bolick, State Constitutions: Freedom’s Frontier, CATO SUP. CT. REV., 2016–
2017, at 15, 15–17; JEFFREY S. SUTTON, 51 IMPERFECT SOLUTIONS: STATES AND THE MAKING OF 
AMERICAN CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 211 (2018) (both offering a new federalism for conservatives), with 
Shirley S. Abrahamson & Diane S. Gutmann, The New Federalism: State Constitutions and State 
Courts, 71 JUDICATURE 88, 88 (1987) (describing a new federalism to achieve liberal goals such as 
expanded rights for criminal defendants). 
19. E.g., Janus v. Am. Fed’n of State, Cty. & Mun. Emps., Council 31, 138 S. Ct. 2448, 2478 
(2018) (overruling Abood v. Detroit Bd. of Educ., 431 U.S. 209 (1977)); South Dakota v. Wayfair, 
Inc., 138 S. Ct. 2080, 2096–97 (2018) (overruling Quill Corp. v. North Dakota, 504 U.S. 298 (1992)); 
accord Trump v. Hawaii, 138 S. Ct. 2392, 2423 (2018) (abrogating Korematsu v. United States, 323 
U.S. 214 (1944)). 
20. E.g., Knick v. Township of Scott, No. 17-647 (U.S. argued Oct. 2, 2018, reargued Jan. 16, 
2019) (considering whether to overrule part of Williamson Cty. Reg’l Planning Comm’n v. Hamilton 
Bank, 473 U.S. 172 (1985)); Gamble v. United States, No. 17-646 (U.S. argued Dec. 6, 2018) 
(considering whether to overrule precedents establishing the Double Jeopardy Clause’s “separate 
sovereigns” exception). 
21. E.g., Michael Stokes Paulsen, The Intrinsically Corrupting Influence of Precedent, 22 
CONST. COMMENT. 289, 298 (2005) (“[S]tare decisis in constitutional law . . . is utterly 
unjustifiable.”). 
22. See Clarence Thomas & John Malcolm, Joseph Story Distinguished Lecture: A Conversation 
with Clarence Thomas (Nov. 22, 2017), HERITAGE FOUND., 
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Our two approaches to stare decisis proposed here seek to guide the court 
through this changing landscape.  The originalism revolution that transformed 
the federal courts in the past thirty years has now reached Wisconsin, bringing 
with it a new generation of originalist/textualists on the bench and in the bar.  
As these new judges and advocates confront constitutional clauses for the first 
time, they use the tools of originalist/textualist analysis that have not been 
applied to these questions in the past century.  This is to say nothing of the 
court’s continued role in addressing more work-a-day issues—insurance, torts, 
and the like—many of which will call for overruling prior cases in whole or in 
part.  In short, we expect, like Justice Rebecca Bradley, that stare decisis will 
enjoy pride of place in many Wisconsin Supreme Court opinions in the next 
few years.  The proposals we sketch here are two ways to better comprehend of 
this principle for classes of cases most likely to raise stare decisis problems in 
the court’s coming terms. 
II. THE GENERAL DOCTRINE OF STARE DECISIS,  
IN WISCONSIN AND ELSEWHERE 
Stare decisis—“to stand by things decided”—is the bedrock legal doctrine 
that the judicial resolution of a present controversy must accord with the 
judicial resolution of identical controversies in the past.23  The doctrine of stare 
decisis is often divided into two distinct sub-doctrines: vertical stare decisis and 
horizontal stare decisis.24  
Vertical stare decisis applies between higher and lower courts in a single 
system—for example, the Wisconsin Supreme Court and the Wisconsin courts 
of appeals and circuit courts,25 or the U.S. Supreme Court, the U.S. Court of 
 
https://www.heritage.org/courts/report/joseph-story-distinguished-lecture-conversation-clarence-
thomas [https://perma.cc/9KSJ-Y3AA] (“I think that the Constitution itself, the written document, is 
the ultimate stare decisis.”); e.g., Timbs v. Indiana, No. 17-1091, 2019 WL 691578, at *8–9 (U.S. Feb. 
20, 2019) (Thomas, J., concurring) (preferring incorporation through the Privileges or Immunities 
Clause rather than the Due Process Clause); McDonald v. City of Chicago, 561 U.S. 742, 855 (2010) 
(Thomas, J., concurring) (rejecting the Slaughter-House Cases, 83 U.S. (16 Wall.) 36 (1872)). 
23. Stare Decisis, BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY (10th ed. 2014); e.g., Kimble v. Marvel Entm’t, 
LLC, 135 S. Ct. 2401, 2409 (2015) (“[T]oday’s Court should stand by yesterday’s decisions. . . .”). 
24. Michael C. Dorf, Dicta and Article III, 142 U. PA. L. REV. 1997, 2024–25 (1994). 
25. Interestingly, the Wisconsin Supreme Court grants (somewhat paradoxically) vertical stare 
decisis to unreversed decisions of the Wisconsin Court of Appeals.  Thus, to disagree with the holding 
of the court of appeals, the Wisconsin Supreme Court must formally engage in stare decisis analysis. 
State v. Grady, 2007 WI 81, ¶ 20, 302 Wis. 2d 80, 734 N.W.2d 364; State v. Douangmala, 2002 WI 
62, ¶ 42, 253 Wis. 2d 173, 646 N.W.2d 1 (“[s]tare decisis requires us to abide by precedent established 
by the court of appeals unless a compelling reason exists to overrule the precedent.”); In re Marriage 
of Cook, 208 Wis. 2d 166, 186, 560 N.W.2d 246, 254 (1997) (reasoning that “[t]he statute provides 
that officially published opinions of the court of appeals shall have statewide precedential effect”).  In 
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Appeals for the Seventh Circuit, and the Eastern and Western Districts of 
Wisconsin.  The doctrine requires lower courts to faithfully apply the decisions 
of higher courts in their system—even if the lower courts believe those 
decisions erroneous26—unless those higher courts have overturned them.  This 
doctrine, that higher courts bind lower courts, is absolute27 and near-universally 
accepted, although there is a good-faith debate on how a higher court’s holding 
should be defined28 and how lower courts should treat higher-court dicta.29 
Horizontal stare decisis—the focus of this Article, and what we will now 
refer to without the leading adjective—operates within the same court, 
requiring it to adhere to its own prior decisions, even if incorrect, unless special 
circumstances are present.30  The “even if incorrect” component is crucial: in 
order for horizontal stare decisis to have any influence, a court must disagree 
 
practice, the Wisconsin Supreme Court likely grants less stare decisis effect to opinions of the Court 
of Appeals than of its own. See, e.g., Milwaukee Police Ass’n. v. City of Milwaukee, 2018 WI 86, 
¶ 44, 383 Wis. 2d 247, 914 N.W.2d 597 (reversing the court of appeals with no indication that its 
decision had any stare decisis weight). 
26. United States v. Bloom, 149 F.3d 649, 653 (7th Cir. 1998) (Easterbrook, J.) (“An inferior 
court is not entitled to say that because the one is more persuasive than the eight, it will follow the 
one.”). 
27. United States v. Duvall, 740 F.3d 604, 609 (D.C. Cir. 2013) (Kavanaugh, J., concurring in 
the denial of rehearing en banc) (“Vertical stare decisis is absolute . . . .”).  There are two notable 
“exceptions”: the U.S. Supreme Court has opened the door to say that its summary affirmances need 
not be followed if subsequent doctrinal developments undermine them. Hicks v. Miranda, 422 U.S. 
332, 344 (1975); see, e.g., Baskin v. Bogan, 766 F.3d 648, 659 (7th Cir. 2014).  And the Wisconsin 
Supreme Court has held that the court of appeals may disregard one of its decisions if it is in direct 
conflict with a subsequent U.S. Supreme Court decision. State v. Jennings, 2002 WI 44, ¶ 43, 252 Wis. 
2d 228, 647 N.W.2d 142.   We use scare quotes because both of these “exceptions” were created by 
the relevant highest court, so a lower court utilizing them is still adhering to vertical stare decisis.  
28. Lawrence B. Solum, The Supreme Court in Bondage: Constitutional Stare Decisis, Legal 
Formalism, and the Future of Unenumerated Rights, 9 U. PA. J. CONST. L. 155, 188 (2006) (discussing 
the “legislative holding” and “ratio decidendi” conception of precedent). 
29. Compare Planned Parenthood of Ind. & Ky., Inc. v. Ind. Dep’t of Health, No. 17-3163, 2018 
WL 3655854 at *3–4 (7th Cir. June 25, 2018) (Easterbrook, J., dissenting from denial of rehearing en 
banc) (“Judicial opinions are not statutes; they resolve only the situations presented for decision.”), 
with Bloom, 149 F.3d at 653 (Easterbrook, J.) (“The Supreme Court often articulates positions through 
language that an unsympathetic audience might dismiss as dictum . . . and it expects these formulations 
to be followed. . . .  Appellate courts that dismiss these expressions and strike off on their own increase 
the disparity among tribunals . . . and frustrate the evenhanded administration of justice . . . .”). 
30. Interestingly, some intermediate appellate courts, including the Wisconsin Court of Appeals, 
do not have the authority to overturn their own cases, thus horizontal stare decisis is absolutely binding 
on these courts. Marriage of Cook, 208 Wis. 2d at 189. 
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with one of its own prior decisions and nevertheless adhere to that decision.31  
So even after a court fully reconsiders a prior precedent—accepting full merits 
briefing from the parties, hearing oral argument, inviting amici to weigh in, etc. 
—it will adhere to the prior decision although it now believes it incorrectly 
decided.32  The U.S. Supreme Court frequently takes this approach,33 as does 
the Wisconsin Supreme Court.34  If, on the other hand, a court opens up its prior 
precedent to reconsideration and becomes independently persuaded to reach the 
same decision as the prior precedent, stare decisis has played no role.35  (In this 
way, stare decisis is identical to deference doctrines.)36 
 
31. Kimble v. Marvel Entm’t, LLC, 135 S. Ct. 2401, 2409 (2015) (“Respecting stare decisis 
means sticking to some wrong decisions.”); Janus v. Am. Fed’n of State, Cty. & Mun. Emps., Council 
31, 138 S. Ct. 2448, 2478 (2018) (concluding that prior decision incorrectly sanctioned a violation of 
the First Amendment, then addressing question of “whether stare decisis nonetheless counsels against 
overruling” that prior decision); see also Transcript of Oral Argument at 53, South Dakota v. Wayfair, 
Inc., 138 S. Ct. 2080 (2018) (No. 17-494) (Chief Justice Roberts: “But the—the assumption, when 
you’re talking about stare decisis, is that the decision was wrong.”); accord Buchmeier v. United States, 
581 F.3d 561, 573 (7th Cir. 2009) (en banc) (Sykes, J., dissenting) (“I take the force of stare decisis 
seriously. . . .  I am convinced, however, that our [previous decision] is mistaken.  Beyond that (and I 
accept that something more should be required to overrule circuit precedent) . . . [the court’s previous 
decision] produces such variable meanings [that it] has proven itself unworkable.  I think it’s time to 
start over.”); State v. Lindell, 2001 WI 108, ¶¶ 145–48, 245 Wis. 2d 689, 629 N.W.2d 223 (A.W. 
Bradley, J., concurring) (arguing that the court should not overrule a decision out of respect for 
precedent even though she dissented in the original decision). 
32. “Many a judge dissents in one case but later follows the majority decision on the basis of 
stare decisis.” Bauer v. Shepard, 620 F.3d 704, 714 (7th Cir. 2010) (Easterbrook, J.).  “Under usual 
circumstances, I would consider myself bound by the doctrine of stare decisis and follow the holding 
in Gaertner despite my disagreement with it.” United States v. Kimberlin, 776 F.2d 1344, 1349 (7th 
Cir. 1985) (Ripple, J., dissenting).  It takes more than argument that a decision is mistaken to justify 
overruling. Tate v. Showboat Marina Casino P’ship, 431 F.3d 580, 582–84 (7th Cir. 2005).  See also 
Linda Greenhouse discussing Chief Justice Rehnquist’s early criticism of Miranda and his opinion 
upholding it in Dickerson. Linda Greenhouse, The Supreme Court: The Precedent; Justices Reaffirm 
Miranda Rule, 7-2; A Part of ‘Culture’, N.Y. TIMES (June 27, 2000), 
https://www.nytimes.com/2000/06/27/us/supreme-court-precedent-justices-reaffirm-miranda-rule-7-
2-part-culture.html [https://perma.cc/4BCM-KFXW]. 
33. E.g., Kimble, 135 S. Ct. at 2406; Planned Parenthood of Se. Pa. v. Casey, 505 U.S. 833, 869 
(1992) (plurality op.); Dickerson v. United States, 530 U.S. 428, 443 (2000). 
34. E.g., Progressive N. Ins. Co. v. Romanshek, 2005 WI 67, ¶¶ 1, 66, 281 Wis. 2d 300, 697 
N.W.2d 417; Jandre v. Wis. Injured Patients & Families Comp. Fund, 2012 WI 39, ¶ 34, 340 Wis. 2d 
31, 813 N.W.2d 627. 
35. Kimble, 135 S. Ct. at 2409 (“Indeed, stare decisis has consequence only to the extent it 
sustains incorrect decisions; correct judgments have no need for that principle to prop them up.”). 
36. See Tetra Tech EC, Inc. v. Wis. Dep’t of Revenue, 2018 WI 75, ¶¶ 20, 78, 382 Wis. 2d 496, 
914 N.W.2d 21; E.I. Du Pont De Nemours & Co. v. Smiley, 138 S. Ct. 2563, 2564 (2018) (Gorsuch, 
J., respecting the denial of certiorari) (“Skidmore deference only makes a difference when the court 
would not otherwise reach the same interpretation as the agency.”). 
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A. The Rule of Law: Stare Decisis’ Main End 
We describe the doctrine of stare decisis as a “bedrock” one because, 
without it, “[t]he alternative is bedlam.”37  “To have a theory of precedent is to 
have a theory of the extent to which judges’ acts are law.”38  As the Wisconsin 
Supreme Court explains, stare decisis is “fundamental to the rule of law,”39 and 
it follows the doctrine “scrupulously” precisely because of its “abiding respect 
for the rule of law.”40  If courts were free to disregard prior, non-distinguishable 
decisions, then resolution of disputes could appear to depend more on who the 
judge is than on a system of laws binding on all.41  Leaving existing law “open 
to revision in every case”—infinitely undecided—transforms “deciding cases” 
into “a mere exercise of judicial will, with arbitrary and unpredictable 
results.”42  That undermines both the “actual and perceived integrity of the 
judicial process.”43  So, in short, stare decisis fulfills the foundational principle 
that “like cases should generally be treated alike.”44  
 
37. United States v. Booker, 375 F.3d 508, 516 (7th Cir. 2004) (Easterbrook, J., dissenting), aff’d 
543 U.S. 220, 267 (2005).  
38. Frank H. Easterbrook, Stability and Reliability in Judicial Decisions, 73 CORNELL L. REV. 
422, 422 (1988) (“Precedent is the device by which a sequence of cases dealing with the same problem 
may be called law rather than will, rules rather than results.”). 
39. Johnson Controls, Inc. v. Emp’rs Ins. of Wausau, 2003 WI 108, ¶ 94, 264 Wis. 2d 60, 665 
N.W.2d 257. 
40. Id. 
41. Easterbrook, supra note 38, at 423. 
42. Schultz v. Natwick, 2002 WI 125, ¶ 37, 257 Wis. 2d 19, 653 N.W.2d 266; see Johnson 
Controls, 2003 WI 108, ¶ 151 (Wilcox, J., dissenting) (“[R]efusing to adhere to stare decisis in this 
case sends a precarious message to litigants suffering adversely from our decisions.  The solidity of the 
judiciary depends upon non-prevailing litigants accepting our decisions and adjusting their behavior 
accordingly.  By overturning established precedent today, after repeatedly refusing to do so in the past, 
the court tells litigants with the means to do so that they are better served through constant 
expostulations and challenges to adverse decisions than by acknowledging the validity of the state’s 
law, even if reluctantly, and abiding by it.”). 
43. Janus v. Am. Fed’n of State, Cty. & Mun. Emps., Council 31, 138 S. Ct. 2448, 2478 (2018); 
see Bartholomew v. Wis. Patients Comp. Fund, 2006 WI 91, ¶ 188, 293 Wis. 2d 38, 717 N.W.2d 216 
(Roggensack, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part) (“[S]tare decisis [is] one of the pillars that 
support the institutional integrity of the court.”). 
44. Epic Sys. Corp. v. Lewis, 138 S. Ct. 1612, 1623 (2018); see also Premier Elec. Constr. Co. 
v. Nat’l Elec. Contractors Ass’n, 814 F.2d 358, 367 (7th Cir. 1987) (Easterbrook, J.); Planned 
Parenthood of Se. Pa. v. Casey, 505 U.S. 833, 854 (1992) (plurality op.) (“Indeed, the very concept of 
the rule of law underlying our own Constitution requires such continuity over time that a respect for 
precedent is, by definition, indispensable.”); Dorf, supra note 24, at 1997.  
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B. Other Related Ends of Stare Decisis 
Beyond its rule-of-law function, stare decisis supports other worthy ends45: 
stability, or respect for the people’s reliance interests;46 “decentraliz[ed] 
decisionmaking,” or “allow[ing] each judge to build on the wisdom of others”;47 
and efficiency of dispute resolution.48  These ends are derivative of the rule-of-
law principle: they are positive effects that flow from following the rule of law, 
of which stare decisis is a critical component.49  A brief word about each: 
On reliance, the doctrine of stare decisis tells the people that the case law 
of yesterday will (likely) be the case law of today and tomorrow.  As Justices 
O’Connor, Kennedy, and Souter famously declared in Casey, “Liberty finds no 
refuge in a jurisprudence of doubt.”50  Thus stare decisis says the people may 
make contracts, develop property, or form businesses with confidence in the 
legal rules governing such conduct. 
As for decentralized decision-making, or “build[ing] on the wisdom”51 of 
judges, “[t]he stock of precedents” to which stare decisis requires a court’s 
assent “is produced by generations of judges wrestling with hard questions.”52  
When viewed as a whole, the body of a single court’s precedent “may 
incorporate more wisdom than any single . . . judge possesses.”53  Thus, 
adhering to this precedent “increases . . . the chance of the court’s being 
right.”54  
On efficiency, the doctrine of stare decisis “sav[es] parties and courts the 
expense of endless relitigation” because it “reduces incentives for challenging 
 
45. John R. Sand & Gravel Co. v. United States, 552 U.S. 130, 139 (2008) (“To overturn a 
decision settling one such matter simply because we might believe that decision is no longer ‘right’ 
would inevitably reflect a willingness to reconsider others.  And that willingness could itself threaten 
to substitute disruption, confusion, and uncertainty for necessary legal stability.”). 
46. Janus, 138 S. Ct. at 2478; Kimble v. Marvel Entm’t, LLC, 135 S. Ct. 2401, 2409 (2015). 
47. Easterbrook, supra note 38, at 423. 
48. Kimble, 135 S. Ct. at 2409 (“[Stare decisis] reduces incentives for challenging settled 
precedents, saving parties and courts the expense of endless relitigation.”); Easterbrook, supra note 38, 
at 423.  
49. See Citizens United v. Fed. Election Comm’n, 558 U.S. 310, 378 (2010) (Roberts, C.J., 
concurring) (calling stare decisis’ “greatest purpose [as] serv[ing] a constitutional ideal—the rule of 
law”).  
50. Planned Parenthood of Se. Pa. v. Casey, 505 U.S. 833, 844 (1992) (plurality op.). 
51. Easterbrook, supra note 38, at 423.  
52. Id. at 422. 
53. Id. at 422–23. 
54. Id. at 423; cf. Burnet v. Coronado Oil & Gas Co., 285 U.S. 393, 407–08 (1932) (“The court 
bows to the lessons of experience and the force of better reasoning, recognizing that the process of trial 
and error, so fruitful in the physical sciences, is appropriate also in the judicial function.”). 
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settled precedents,” since such a challenge immediately faces an uphill climb.55  
So even if the undoing of an incorrect precedent would win a litigant’s case—
perhaps, for example, Marbury v. Madison56 or the Slaughter House Cases57—
that litigant would be wise to make the best of existing case law and try to win 
under the cases as they are rather than as they wish them to be. 
All of this adds up to the Wisconsin Supreme Court’s conclusion that “in 
most matters it is more important that the applicable rule of law be settled than 
that it be settled right.”58  The court settling on a clear system of rules allows 
society to better enjoy liberty—even if some of those rules are legally 
erroneous—than the court considering all rules subject to revision at will. 
C. When Stare Decisis Gives Way 
All the same, “stare decisis is not an inexorable command.”59  Rather, it 
must be balanced against “a second generally accepted principle”—that under 
some conditions, the law may need to “accommodate to changing 
circumstances.”60  In other cases, the law may change because a prior decision 
was simply wrong; as Chief Justice Roberts powerfully reminds us, if stare 
decisis were absolute, then “segregation would be legal, minimum wage laws 
would be unconstitutional, and the Government could wiretap ordinary criminal 
 
55. Kimble v. Marvel Entm’t, LLC, 135 S. Ct. 2401, 2409 (2015); accord Ed Whelan, Richard 
Hasen’s Jumble of Confusions—Part 1, NAT’L REV. (Apr. 2, 2018), 
https://www.nationalreview.com/bench-memos/richard-hasen-book-antonin-scalia-flawed/ 
[https://perma.cc/JP6G-4MPR] (“As Scalia wrote in A Matter of Interpretation, ‘Originalism, like any 
other theory of interpretation put into practice in an ongoing system of law, must accommodate the 
doctrine of stare decisis; it cannot remake the world anew.’  There is plenty of room to argue, as Justice 
Thomas does, that Scalia is too accepting of mistaken precedent that is settled, or to contend that the 
whole question of whether precedent is “settled” is too indeterminate to be meaningful.”). 
56. Transcript of Oral Argument at 30, Dalmazzi v. United States, 138 S. Ct. 53 (2018) (No. 16-
961) (Justice Kennedy, asking counsel in jest, “Do you think Marbury versus Madison is right?”). 
57. Transcript of Oral Argument at 7, McDonald v. City of  Chicago, 561 U.S. 742 (2010) (No. 
08-1521) (Justice Scalia criticizing counsel for asking the Court to overrule the Slaughter House Cases: 
“[W]hat you argue is the darling of the professoriate, for sure, but it’s also contrary to 140 years of our 
jurisprudence.  Why do you want to undertake that burden instead of just arguing substantive due 
process?  Which, as much as I think it’s wrong, I have—even I have acquiesced in it.”). 
58. Johnson Controls, Inc. v. Emp’rs Ins. of Wausau, 2003 WI 108, ¶ 97, 264 Wis. 2d 60, 665 
N.W.2d 257 (ultimately quoting Burnet v. Coronado Oil & Gas Co., 285 U.S. 393, 406 (1932) 
(Brandeis, J., dissenting)).  
59. Janus v. Am. Fed’n of State, Cty. & Mun. Emps., Council 31, 138 S. Ct. 2448, 2478 (2018) 
(citation omitted); State v. Denny, 2017 WI 17, ¶ 71, 373 Wis. 2d 390, 891 N.W.2d 144.  
60. See State v. Stevens, 181 Wis. 2d 410, 442, 511 N.W.2d 591, 602 (1994) (Abrahamson, J., 
concurring). 
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suspects without first obtaining warrants.”61  Those evocative examples support 
the Wisconsin Supreme Court’s statement that it “do[es] more damage to the 
rule of law by obstinately refusing to admit errors, thereby perpetuating 
injustice, than by overturning an erroneous decision.”62  In this way, the need 
to overturn precedent flows (almost paradoxically) from the same foundational 
principle as the need to follow it: the rule of law. 
Not surprisingly, courts explain that they “will not . . . abandon[ ] 
[precedent] lightly”63 or “casually.”64  Rather, any departure demands 
“special,”65 “sufficient,”66 or “compelling”67 justification.  So, having recounted 
the basic rule of stare decisis (follow on-point precedent, both correct and 
incorrect) and its justifications (rule of law, reliance, decentralized decision-
making, efficiency), we next address when stare decisis gives way.  We will 
briefly explain the tests used by the U.S. Supreme Court and the Wisconsin 
Supreme Court when considering whether to overturn precedent and depart 
from stare decisis in a given case.  Both, as we will see, deploy extensive, 
though not identical, multi-factor balancing tests. 
1. U.S. Supreme Court 
As the U.S. Supreme Court recently recounted in Janus—the landmark case 
overruling a forty-year-old precedent to hold that forcing public-sector 
employees to pay agency fees to a union violates the First Amendment—the 
Court looks to a multi-factor balancing test to determine whether it will depart 
from stare decisis.68  This test comprises “a series of prudential and pragmatic 
considerations” and “gauge[s] the respective costs of reaffirming and 
 
61. Citizens United v. Fed. Election Comm’n, 558 U.S. 310, 377 (2010) (Roberts, C.J., 
concurring) (citing Plessy v. Ferguson, 163 U.S. 537 (1896), overruled by Brown v. Bd. of Educ., 347 
U.S. 483 (1954); Adkins v. Children’s Hospital of D.C., 261 U.S. 525 (1923), overruled by West Coast 
Hotel Co. v. Parrish, 300 U.S. 379 (1937); Olmstead v. United States, 277 U.S. 438 (1928), overruled 
by Katz v. United States, 389 U.S. 347 (1967)). 
62. Johnson Controls, 2003 WI 108, ¶ 100. 
63. Schultz v. Natwick, 2002 WI 125, ¶ 37, 257 Wis. 2d 19, 653 N.W.2d 266; accord Janus, 138 
S. Ct. at 2478 (“strong grounds”). 
64. Stevens, 181 Wis. 2d at 442 (Abrahamson, J., concurring); Denny, 2017 WI 17, ¶ 143 (A.W. 
Bradley, J., dissenting); accord Janus, 138 S. Ct. at 2478 (“strong grounds”). 
65. Denny, 2017 WI 17, ¶ 69; Schultz, 2002 WI 125, ¶ 37; accord Kimble v. Marvel Entm’t, 
LLC, 135 S. Ct. 2401, 2409 (2015). 
66. Stevens, 181 Wis. 2d at 442 (Abrahamson, J., concurring); accord Kimble, 135 S. Ct. at 2409. 
67. Wenke v. Gehl Co., 2004 WI 103, ¶ 21, 274 Wis. 2d 220, 682 N.W.2d 405; accord Citizens 
United v. Fed. Election Comm’n, 558 U.S. 310, 362 (2010) (“the most convincing of reasons”). 
68. Janus, 138 S. Ct. at 2478–79. 
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overruling a prior case.”69  It “must balance the importance of having [the legal] 
questions decided against the importance of having them decided right.”70  
Factors the Court considers include (1) “the quality of [the precedent’s] 
reasoning,”71 for example, the integrity of its treatment of historical sources72 
or whether it “abandoned [important legal] principles;”73 (2) “the workability 
of the rule it established”74 or, in other words, its “real world implementation;”75 
(3) whether it is “consisten[t] with other related decisions”76 or if its 
“foundations . . . have sustained serious erosion;”77 (4) “developments since the 
decision was handed down,”78 for example, “far-reaching systemic and 
structural changes in the economy,”79 “[r]apid changes in technology,”80 or the 
“emerging recognition” of new moral principles in society;81 and (5) the 
 
69. Planned Parenthood of Se. Pa. v. Casey, 505 U.S. 833, 854 (1992) (plurality op.). 
70. Citizens United, 558 U.S. at 378. 
71. Janus, 138 S. Ct. at 2478. 
72. Lawrence v. Texas, 539 U.S. 558, 571 (2003) (“[T]he historical grounds relied upon in 
Bowers are more complex than the majority opinion and the concurring opinion by Chief Justice Burger 
indicate.”). 
73. Citizens United, 558 U.S. at 363. 
74. Janus, 138 S. Ct. at 2478; see also Casey, 505 U.S. at 854 (“whether the rule has proven to 
be intolerable simply in defying practical workability”). 
75. South Dakota v. Wayfair, Inc., 138 S. Ct. 2080, 2097 (2018). 
76. Janus, 138 S. Ct. at 2478; see also Lawrence, 539 U.S. at 577 (“Bowers itself causes 
uncertainty, for the precedents before and after its issuance contradict its central holding.”); Casey, 505 
U.S. at 855 (“whether related principles of law have so far developed as to have left the old rule no 
more than a remnant of abandoned doctrine”); Kimble v. Marvel Entm’t, LLC, 135 S. Ct. 2401, 2411 
(2015) (asking whether the previous decision is a “doctrinal dinosaur or legal last-man-standing”). 
77. Lawrence, 539 U.S. at 576. 
78. Janus, 138 S. Ct. at 2478–79; see also Lawrence, 539 U.S. at 577 (“Bowers itself causes 
uncertainty, for the precedents before and after its issuance contradict its central holding.”); Casey, 505 
U.S. at 855 (“whether facts have so changed, or come to be seen so differently, as to have robbed the 
old rule of significant application or justification”).  And in Citizens United and Janus, the Court added 
another qualification: when the First Amendment is in play, stare decisis is even weaker. Citizens 
United, 558 U.S. at 363; Janus, 138 S. Ct. at 2478. 
79. Wayfair, 138 S. Ct. at 2097. 
80. Citizens United, 558 U.S. at 364. 
81. Lawrence, 539 U.S. at 572. 
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“reliance on the decision,”82 or whether it “causes uncertainty.”83  Of course, 
this list is not exhaustive.84 
The strength of the showing necessary to overturn the decision depends on 
still more inputs.  When the decision interprets the Constitution, less showing 
is required, since the Court alone can correct course.85  When it’s a statute, more 
showing is required, since Congress may always intervene.86  When precedent 
“prohibit[s] the States from exercising their lawful sovereign powers,” less 
showing.87  “When neither party defends the reasoning of a precedent,” less 
showing.88  But for “cases involving property and contract rights,” then the 
Court needs more showing89—unless the case deals with the Sherman Act, in 
which case, less showing will suffice.90  And then there’s whatever showing it 
takes to overrule a “super-precedent,”91 and the question of whether precedents 
about methodology are precedential at all.92 
 
82. Janus, 138 S. Ct. at 2479; see also Lawrence, 539 U.S. at 560; Casey, 505 U.S. at 854 
(“whether the rule is subject to a kind of reliance that would lend a special hardship to the consequences 
of overruling and add inequity to the cost of repudiation”). 
83. Lawrence, 539 U.S. at 560.  
84. See Janus, 138 S. Ct. at 2478; e.g., Citizens United, 558 U.S. at 412 (“antiquity” of the 
precedent). 
85. Janus, 138 S. Ct. at 2478. 
86. See id. at 2478; see also Kimble v. Marvel Entm’t, LLC, 135 S. Ct. 2401, 2409 (2015). 
87. South Dakota v. Wayfair, Inc., 138 S. Ct. 2080, 2096 (2018). 
88. Citizens United, 558 U.S. at 363. 
89. Kimble, 135 S. Ct. at 2410 (2015) (citation omitted). 
90. Id. at 2412. 
91. Michael J. Gerhardt, Super Precedent, 90 MINN. L. REV. 1204, 1205–06 (2006); see also 
Planned Parenthood of Ind. & Ky., Inc. v. Ind. Dep’t of Health, 888 F.3d 300, 311–13 (7th Cir. 2018) 
(Manion, J., concurring in the judgment in part and dissenting in part); Richmond Med. Ctr. for Women 
v. Gilmore, 219 F.3d 376, 376–77 (4th Cir. 2000) (Luttig, J., concurring): 
I understand the Supreme Court to have intended its decision in Planned 
Parenthood v. Casey to be a decision of super-stare decisis with respect to a 
woman’s fundamental right to choose whether or not to proceed with a 
pregnancy.  And I believe this understanding to have been not merely confirmed, 
but reinforced, by the Court’s recent decision in Stenberg v. Carhart. 
(citations omitted.) 
92. See Chad M. Oldfather, Methodological Stare Decisis and Constitutional Interpretation, in 
PRECEDENT IN THE UNITED STATES SUPREME COURT 135, 137 (Christopher J. Peters ed., 2013).  See 
generally Abbe R. Gluck, The States as Laboratories of Statutory Interpretation: Methodological 
Consensus and the New Modified Textualism, 119 YALE L.J. 1750, 1754 (2010).   
We believe in methodological consensus because we believe particular approaches to the judicial job 
to be right.  We are especially emphatic about vertical methodological stare decisis because of the 
respect we believe lower courts owe to higher courts that have definitively achieved and maintained 
that consensus. See Daniel R. Suhr, Interpreting Wisconsin Statutes, 100 MARQ. L. REV. 969 (2017).  
We need not repeat here the broader arguments around the deference owed methodological precedents 
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2. Wisconsin Supreme Court 
The Wisconsin Supreme Court most definitively explained its stare decisis 
approach in Johnson Controls in 2003.  There, and in a few subsequent cases, 
the court identified seven factors: (1) changes or developments in the law have 
undermined the rationale behind a decision; (2) there is a need to make a 
decision correspond to newly ascertained facts; (3) there is a showing that the 
precedent has become detrimental to coherence and consistency in the law 
(when the cases in a particular area are a doctrinal mess, lacking any 
consistency, the court may repudiate some or all to bring clarity93); (4) the prior 
decision is unsound in principle94 (when two cases “cannot be reconciled 
without generating . . . arbitrary and illogical distinctions,” one must be 
overruled95); (5) the prior decision is unworkable in practice96 (when a 
precedent simply doesn’t work in practice, such that later cases prompt courts 
to “engraft exceptions upon it” constantly to avoid its import, it is ready for 
reversal97); (6) “whether reliance interests are implicated”; and (7) “whether it 
has produced a settled body of law”98 (when an error undermines an entire 
statutory scheme and cannot be contained to a particular situation, stare decisis 
 
(i.e., lessened reliance interests, etc.), methodological discussions as dicta, etc., because those 
arguments are fully made elsewhere. See, e.g., Oldfather, supra; Evan J. Criddle & Glen Staszewski, 
Essay, Against Methodological Stare Decisis, 102 GEO. L.J. 1573, 1574–76 (2014). 
93. Johnson Controls, Inc. v. Emp’rs Ins. of Wausau, 2003 WI 108, ¶ 106, 264 Wis. 2d 60, 665 
N.W.2d 257 (citing City of Milwaukee v. Firemen’s Relief Ass’n, 42 Wis. 2d 23, 37–38, 165 N.W.2d 
384, 392 (1969)). 
94. State v. Popenhagen, 2008 WI 55, ¶ 70, 309 Wis. 2d 601, 749 N.W.2d 611 (“Mistaken 
statements of the law should not constitute precedent that binds this court. . . .  We do more damage to 
the rule of law by refusing to admit error than by correcting an erroneous proposition of law.”); State 
v. Lynch, 2016 WI 66, ¶ 39 n.17, 371 Wis. 2d 1, 885 N.W.2d 89 (criticizing when “courts have 
continued to blindly adhere to poorly reasoned cases solely because they have felt compelled to do 
so. . . .  We cannot continue to pass the buck.  We must roll up our sleeves and dig into the law.  
Interpreting the Constitution is, after all, the ultimate responsibility of this court.”). 
95. Johnson Controls, 2003 WI 108, ¶ 105. 
96. Bartholomew v. Wis. Patients Comp. Fund, 2006 WI 91, ¶ 33, 293 Wis. 2d 38, 717 N.W.2d 
216.  Sometimes the “unsound in principle” factor is instead phrased as “objectively wrong.” See, e.g., 
State v. Douangmala, 2002 WI 62, ¶ 42, 253 Wis. 2d 173, 646 N.W.2d 1. 
97. Johnson Controls, 2003 WI 108, ¶ 108 (quoting Wilcox v. Wilcox, 26 Wis. 2d 617, 624–25, 
133 N.W.2d 408, 412 (1965)). 
98. Johnson Controls, 2003 WI 108, ¶¶ 99–100.  Earlier the Court suggested that it would follow 
the stare decisis analysis of Planned Parenthood v. Casey, but that articulation of the doctrine was 
supplanted by the factors listed in Johnson Controls. See State v. Outagamie Cty. Bd. of Adjustment, 
2001 WI 78, ¶¶ 29–31, 244 Wis. 2d 613, 628 N.W.2d 376. 
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gives way99).  And not every factor is necessary in every case—for example, in 
Denny the court overturned a prior decision with no analysis of reliance 
interests.100 
The Wisconsin Supreme Court has also identified factors that it will not 
consider.  It is not sufficient that “a large majority of other jurisdictions, with 
no binding authority on this court, have reached opposing conclusions.”101  This 
often makes sense, since the Wisconsin Supreme Court is interpreting 
Wisconsin law, which often addresses the same substantive problem as other 
jurisdictions with different particular texts.  The court also frequently reiterates 
that a mere change in the membership of the court, the presence of a new judge, 
is not sufficient for stare decisis to give way.102  After all, “[t]his court is more 
than simply the sum of its current members.  It is an institution that endures 
long after any one individual justice leaves the bench,” and its decisions are 
more than “collection[s] of several law review articles by members of th[e] 
court.”103 
As in the U.S. Supreme Court, the strength of Wisconsin’s stare decisis test 
is calibrated by other inputs.  For instance, “considerations in favor of stare 
decisis are at their acme in cases involving property and contract rights, where 
reliance interests are involved.”104  In other cases, “[c]onsiderations of stare 
decisis are stronger where the legislative prerogative to overturn [court] 
decisions is involved.”105  In a case of statutory interpretation, if the court errs, 
the legislature may amend the statute to clarify its desired outcome.  That is not 
nearly so easy if the court botches a case of constitutional interpretation, which 
suggests the court must exercise greater scrutiny of its precedents in 
constitutional cases.106  Some members of the court have argued that permitting 
 
99. State v. Denny, 2017 WI 17, ¶ 70, 373 Wis. 2d 390, 891 N.W.2d 144. 
100. Id. ¶¶ 69–71. 
101. Johnson Controls, 2003 WI 108, ¶ 100. 
102. State v. Lynch, 2016 WI 66, ¶ 102, 371 Wis. 2d 1, 885 N.W.2d 89 (Abrahamson & A.W. 
Bradley, JJ., dissenting); Johnson Controls, 2003 WI 108, ¶ 135 (Wilcox, J., dissenting); Welch v. 
State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co., 122 Wis. 2d 172, 182, 361 N.W.2d 680, 685 (1985) (Steinmetz, J. 
dissenting). But see Part IV, infra, arguing that membership changes accompanied by watershed 
elections do affect stare decisis. 
103. Lynch, 2016 WI 66, ¶ 231 (Ziegler, J., dissenting). 
104. Johnson Controls, 2003 WI 108, ¶ 141 (Wilcox, J., dissenting) (quoting Payne v. Tennessee, 
501 U.S. 808, 828 (1991)); id. ¶ 143 (“[S]tare decisis concerns are particularly strong where substantial 
reliance in the affected business community occurs.”); Denny, 2017 WI 17, ¶ 158 (A.W. Bradley, J., 
dissenting). 
105. Johnson Controls, 2003 WI 108, ¶ 140 (Wilcox, J., dissenting); see State v. Douangmala, 
2002 WI 62, ¶ 42, 253 Wis. 2d 173, 646 N.W.2d 1. 
106. Lynch, 2016 WI 66, ¶ 39 n.18. 
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an error in statutory interpretation to persist undermines the legislature and its 
policy choices, a view which reduces the deference owed to precedent.107  And 
some members suggest that doctrines that have been around awhile have greater 
stare decisis protection,108 while others would say that older precedents are less 
likely to be connected to the realities of the modern world and thus less entitled 
to stare decisis.109 
III. DISCUSSION OF THE DOCTRINE 
We have now recounted the Wisconsin Supreme Court’s stare decisis 
doctrine, which is roughly parallel to that of the U.S. Supreme Court: the court 
must follow on-point precedent, unless—after applying a multi-factor 
balancing test, calibrated in strength by myriad additional considerations—it 
concludes that a sufficient justification exists to overrule the precedent.  We 
now turn to our discussion of these approaches, before suggesting two 
alternative approaches applicable in some classes of cases. 
Our concern is simple: the current stare decisis doctrine, comprising factors 
upon factors, nuanced by various additional considerations, inevitably results 
in near-limitless, individualized judicial discretion.110  That is, multi-factor 
balancing tests generally lead to judicial discretion, and very complex ones, like 
the stare decisis doctrine, allow that near-limitless discretion to be exercised by 
each judge in a unique way.  Importantly, this near-limitless, individualized 
discretion flows directly from the nature of the doctrine, not from a 
misapplication of it.111  Thus, our criticism is not of the integrity or competency 
of the judges applying the doctrine, but of the doctrine itself.  Even judges 
 
107. Denny, 2017 WI 17, ¶ 70 n.16. 
108. See Lynch, 2016 WI 66, ¶ 98 (Abrahamson & A.W. Bradley, JJ., dissenting); State v. 
Stevens, 181 Wis. 2d 410, 442, 511 N.W.2d 591, 602 (1994) (Abrahamson, J., concurring). 
109. State v. Michels Pipeline Const., Inc., 63 Wis. 2d 278, 295, 217 N.W.2d 339, 347 (1974) 
(citing State v. Esser, 16 Wis. 2d 567, 582, 115 N.W.2d 505, 513 (1962)). 
110. Judge Easterbrook pointedly put his similar criticism this way: a “multi-factor balancing 
test with two tiers, three prongs per tier, and four tines per prong” is a “bad rule[ ],” “[t]oo many forks 
in doctrine produce forks in tongues.” Easterbrook, supra note 38, at 424. 
111. Accord DeGuelle v. Camilli, 724 F.3d 933, 937 (7th Cir. 2013) (criticizing Wisconsin’s 
collateral estoppel test similarly); United States v. Rosales, 716 F.3d 996, 997–99 (7th Cir. 2013) 
(criticizing a test found within the U.S. Sentencing Guidelines similarly).  As Minnesota Supreme 
Court Justice Barry Anderson has said: “a 26-factor domicile test is no test at all.” Mauer v. Comm’r 
of Revenue, 829 N.W.2d 59, 78 (Minn. 2013) (Anderson, J., dissenting).  See generally Antonin Scalia, 
The Rule of Law as a Law of Rules, 56 U. CHI. L. REV. 1175, 1176 (1989). 
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applying the doctrine in good faith will end with a result marked by discretion 
and individual views.112 
Because of this near-limitless, individualized discretion, whether a court 
will adhere to stare decisis in a given case is unpredictable.  The courts describe 
the doctrine explicitly as a “principle of policy”;113 it represents a judicial policy 
judgment that stability is more important that correctness in law.114  So, under 
the current approach, courts are overtly guided by “principle[s] of policy,” not 
the “inexorable command[s]” of the law.115  This inevitably—that is, by 
design—leads to courts making policy decisions, weighing arguments about 
reliance interests or workability, rather than assuming the age-old task of 
declaring what the law is.116  So since policy—not strict law—is at play, “[e]ach 
suggestion that [a] case[ ] must be overturned must be scrutinized 
individually,”117 meaning the decision to overturn precedent in one case is 
unlikely to meaningfully assist in deciding whether to overturn precedent in a 
different case.  After all, no two proper evaluations of all of the factors and 
considerations could possibly be the same.  In other words, the “grand 
balancing test[s]” used by Wisconsin Supreme Court and the U.S. Supreme 
Court have “neither a maximand nor weights to produce a decision when the 
criteria conflict, as they always do.”118  Each factor is apparently equally 
important, and thus arguably equally unimportant in a given case.  Thus, no 
rules govern conflicts between the factors.  For example, there is no defined 
way to decide when, if ever, the quality of a decision’s reasoning is so poor that 
 
112. See, e.g., Craig S. Lerner, Justice Scalia’s Eighth Amendment Jurisprudence: The Failure 
of Sake-of-Argument Originalism, 42 HARV. J.L. & PUB. POL’Y 91, 160 (2019) (discussing Justice 
Scalia’s seesawing between stare-decisis and originalism in the Eighth Amendment context); accord 
Thomas & Malcolm, supra note 22 (“Justice [Arthur] Goldberg’s theory [of stare decisis] was 
basically ‘It’s a ratchet.’  As you improve civil liberties, those strict rules of stare decisis apply when 
you win those cases.  But when they need to overrule cases in order to do what he thinks is the right 
thing, then a loose set of rules of stare decisis apply.” (alterations in original.)). 
113. Johnson Controls, Inc. v. Emp’rs Ins. of Wausau, 2003 WI 108, ¶ 97, 264 Wis. 2d 60, 665 
N.W.2d 257.  
114. In that way, stare decisis is a judicially created doctrine not unlike the presumption of 
constitutionality or the preference for constitutional avoidance.  Both of those doctrines are policy 
choices, made by the judiciary, for the benefit of the legislature.   
115. Denny, 2017 WI 17, ¶ 71 (ultimately quoting Payne v. Tennessee, 501 U.S. 808 (1991)). 
116. Compare State v. Lynch, 2016 WI 66, ¶ 39 n.17, 371 Wis. 2d 1, 885 N.W.2d 89 (Gableman, 
J., lead op.) (“[C]ourts have continued to blindly adhere to poorly reasoned cases solely because they 
have felt compelled to do so. . . .  We cannot continue to pass the buck.  We must roll up our sleeves 
and dig into the law.  Interpreting the Constitution is, after all, the ultimate responsibility of this 
court.”), with id. ¶¶ 208–09 (Ziegler, J., dissenting).  Supporting Justice Gableman’s view, see 
generally Koschkee v. Evers, 2018 WI 82, ¶ 46, 382 Wis. 2d 666, 913 N.W.2d 878.  
117. Denny, 2017 WI 17, ¶ 71.  
118. Easterbrook, supra note 38, at 422.  
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all reliance interests must give way, or when a decision’s workability is so high 
that no erosion of its theoretical foundations will topple it.   
Further, it is not evident why appellate judges should be making the policy 
determinations called for in stare decisis doctrine.  The explicitly policy-
oriented approach puts judges in the uncomfortable situation of making 
predictions from current business practices to trends in social mores, and the 
reliance interests at stake in each—and then declaring that these policy 
judgments outweigh the correct conclusion as to the law.  Moreover, given that 
stare decisis is a question of law reserved for appellate courts, not of fact for 
trial courts, judges may have to make these policy judgments in the dark.  For 
example, an appellate court may be called upon to determine the business 
community’s reliance on a particular precedent without the benefit of expert 
testimony, competing economic studies, or the like.119 
So, ironically, the stare decisis doctrine’s primary goal is to protect the rule 
of law, yet, because every judge enjoys such great latitude in applying it, the 
doctrine results in the rule of men.120  Its aim is to promote stability, 
predictability, and reliance, yet it is itself unpredictable.121  And even the 
benefits of decentralized decision-making and efficiency fall short: with so 
much discretion, the lessons of history will be only partially heeded (a 
weakened decentralized decision-making), and litigants are still advised to 
challenge unfavorable precedent in the chance that their case happens to contain 
the mix of factors persuasive to the court (inefficiency).      
The foregoing discussion about the variability of the doctrine can be 
demonstrated by reviewing the records of any set of appellate judges, any cross-
section of which will show the diversity of dedication to precedent and the 
difficulty of applying the myriad factors in individual cases.  Looking to the 
records of the justices of the Wisconsin Supreme Court, they each find 
 
119. E.g., Janus v. Am. Fed’n of State, Cty. & Mun. Emps., Council 31, 138 S. Ct. 2448, 2484–
86 (analyzing the reliance of public-sector unions on a decision favorable to their interests with the 
only record evidence noted being a single contract between the parties).  
120. THE FEDERALIST No. 78, at 490, 493 (Alexander Hamilton); Scalia, supra note 111.  
121. See Johnson Controls, Inc. v. Emp’rs Ins. of Wausau, 2003 WI 108, ¶ 151, 264 Wis. 2d 60, 
665 N.W.2d 257 (Wilcox, J., dissenting) (“[R]efusing to adhere to stare decisis in this case sends a 
precarious message to litigants suffering adversely from our decisions.  The solidity of the judiciary 
depends upon non-prevailing litigants accepting our decisions and adjusting their behavior accordingly.  
By overturning established precedent today, after repeatedly refusing to do so in the past, the court tells 
litigants with the means to do so that they are better served through constant expostulations and 
challenges to adverse decisions than by acknowledging the validity of the state’s law, even if 
reluctantly, and abiding by it.”). 
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themselves in the awkward juxtaposition of holding that the court must respect 
stare decisis and defer to precedent, except when they think the court should 
overrule a prior case and not follow precedent—all based solely on their own 
weighing of the relevant factors and considerations.122  Again, we believe that 
this troubling result is the product of the faithful application of stare decisis 
doctrine as currently conceived, not of a deliberate overstepping by the 
judiciary.  In other words, the doctrine is so indeterminate, so sensitive to an 
individual judge’s views, that the judiciary’s “judgment” on whether to follow 
stare decisis inevitably looks no different than an exercise of “force” or 
“will.”123 
 
122. Thus, for example, Chief Justice Roggensack would follow stare decisis in Bartholomew v. 
Wisconsin Patients Compensation Fund, 2006 WI 91, ¶¶ 185–93, 293 Wis. 2d 38, 717 N.W.2d 216 
(Roggensack, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part), but not in State v. Lynch, 2016 WI 66 n.1, 
371 Wis. 2d 1, 885 N.W.2d 89. 
Justice Abrahamson would follow precedent in Coyne v. Walker, 2016 WI 38, ¶ 82, 368 Wis. 2d 444, 
879 N.W.2d 606 (Abrahamson, J., concurring), St. Croix County Department of Health & Human 
Services v. Michael D., 2016 WI 35, ¶¶ 85–86, 368 Wis. 2d 170, 880 N.W.2d 107 (Abrahamson, J., 
and A.W. Bradley, J., dissenting), State v. Houghton, 2015 WI 79, ¶ 83, 364 Wis. 2d 234, 868 N.W. 
2d 143 (Abrahamson, J., dissenting), Jandre v. Wisconsin Injured Patients & Families Compensation 
Fund, 2012 WI 39, ¶ 34, 340 Wis. 2d 31, 813 N.W.2d 627, Schultz v. Natwick, 2002 WI 125, ¶¶ 37–
38, 257 Wis. 2d 19, 653 N.W.2d 266, State v. Lindell, 2001 WI 108, ¶¶ 150–53, 245 Wis. 2d 689, 629 
N.W.2d 223, State v. Stevens, 181 Wis. 2d 410, 442–43, 511 N.W.2d 591, 602 (1994) (Abrahamson, 
J., concurring), State v. Fuerte, 2017 WI 104, ¶ 43, 378 Wis. 2d 504, 904 N.W.2d 773 (Abrahamson, 
J., dissenting), and State v. Outagamie County Board of Adjustment, 2001 WI 78, ¶¶ 132–35, 244 Wis. 
2d 613, 628 N.W.2d 376 (Abrahamson, C.J., dissenting), but not in State v. Luedtke, 2015 WI 42, ¶ 
92–99, 362 Wis. 2d 1, 863 N.W.2d 592 (Abrahamson, J., concurring), Bartholomew, 2006 WI 91, ¶¶ 
31–51, State v. Douangmala, 2002 WI 62, ¶ 42, 253 Wis. 2d 173, 646 N.W.2d 1, or State v. City of 
Oak Creek, 2000 WI 9, ¶ 85, 232 Wis. 2d 612, 605 N.W.2d 526 (Abrahamson, C.J., dissenting).  Fuerte 
illustrates the fraught nature of these cases: the court’s majority there (over Abrahamson’s dissent) 
overruled Douangmala (where she was in the majority), which itself overruled four precedents set by 
the Court of Appeals. 
Justice A.W. Bradley would follow stare decisis in St. Croix County Department of Health, 2016 WI, 
¶¶ 85–86 (Abrahamson and A.W. Bradley, JJ., dissenting), Lindell, 2001 WI 108, ¶¶ 145–48 (A.W. 
Bradley, J., concurring); Denny, 2017 WI 17, ¶¶ 134–37 (A.W. Bradley, J., dissenting), but not in State 
v. Ferron, 219 Wis. 2d 481, 514, 579 N.W.2d 654, 668 (1998) (A.W. Bradley, J., dissenting). 
Justice Ziegler would follow precedent in Lynch, 2016 WI 66, ¶¶ 204–16 (Ziegler, J., dissenting), but 
not in Denny, 2017 WI 17, ¶ 69; accord Coyne, 2016 WI 38, ¶ 249 n.2 (urging reexamination of a 
precedent). 
Justice R.W. Bradley would follow precedent in State v. Suriano, 2017 WI 42, ¶ 29, 374 Wis. 2d 683, 
893 N.W.2d 543, but not in State v. Friedlander, 2019 WI 22, ¶ 24, 923 N.W.2d 849. 
Likewise, Justice Kelly would follow precedent in Suriano, 2017 WI 42, ¶ 29, but not in Friedlander, 
2019 WI 22, ¶ 24. 
123. THE FEDERALIST No. 78 (Alexander Hamilton); accord Solum, supra note 28, at 156 (“In 
the Warren Court era, the political, judicial, and academic left seemed to view constitutional stare 
decisis as the enemy of progressive (living constitution) constitutionalism.  In the Roberts Court era, 
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While our criticism is relatively simple, we unfortunately offer no 
correspondingly simple solution.  We cannot offer here a universal theory to 
answer when a court should adhere to stare decisis in a given case.  Further, we 
do not argue that the Wisconsin Supreme Court (or the U.S. Supreme Court) 
should jettison the doctrine altogether.  We recognize that stare decisis came 
about for good reasons: reliance interests are real, prior generations of judges 
did their job with wisdom, and efficiency in dispute resolution is important.  
Litigants and the public at large need to know courts function as neutral 
decisionmakers, delivering equal justice under law. 
Instead, what we offer are two different theories that each justify the 
Wisconsin Supreme Court side-stepping this quagmire to review anew the 
merits of precedent in some classes of cases.  In other words, our two 
approaches allow the court, in some classes of cases, to directly overrule 
precedent without the need to consider whether stare decisis commands a 
different result.  Thus, by avoiding the need to navigate the twists and turns of 
the doctrine in these classes of cases, these two proposals would on balance 
create a more predictable judicial system.124 
 
 
 
stare decisis may be the last defense of Warren Court precedents against conservative (originalist) 
constitutionalism on the ascendancy.”). 
124. We keep the focus of our two theories on Wisconsin specifically, content otherwise to refer 
readers to the broad body of scholarship that exists on the overall jurisprudential merit of stare decisis, 
especially for those who claim the mantle of originalism.  In fact, this is a topic as old as this journal. 
W. F. Kuzenski, Stare Decisis, 6 MARQ. L. REV. 65, 69 (1922).  For discussions of a more recent 
vintage, see, for example, Robert A. Burt, Precedent and Authority in Antonin Scalia’s Jurisprudence, 
12 CARDOZO L. REV. 1685, 1685–86 (1991); Kozel, supra note 4, at 414; Nelson Lund, Stare Decisis 
and Originalism, 19 GEO. MASON L. REV. 1029, 1029 (2012); John F. Manning, Scalia and the Idea 
of Judicial Restraint, 115 MICH. L. REV. 747, 747–48 (2017); John O. McGinnis & Michael B. 
Rappaport, Reconciling Originalism and Precedent, 103 NW. U. L. REV. 803, 803 (2009); Tom 
Goldstein, Justice Thomas and Constitutional “Stare Indecisis”, SCOTUSBLOG (Oct. 8, 2007, 4:42 
PM), https://www.scotusblog.com/2007/10/justice-thomas-and-constitutional-stare-indecisis/ 
[https://perma.cc/U4DD-TQ9X]; David A. Strauss, Originalism, Conservatism, and Judicial Restraint, 
34 HARV. J.L. & PUB. POL’Y 137, 137 (2011); Thomas W. Merrill, Originalism, Stare Decisis and the 
Promotion of Judicial Restraint, 22 CONST. COMMENT. 271, 272–73 (2005); Gary Lawson, The 
Constitutional Case Against Precedent, 17 HARV. J.L. & PUB. POL’Y 23, 23 (1994); Paulsen, supra 
note 21, at 289; Stephen Markman, Originalism and Stare Decisis, 34 HARV. J.L. & PUB. POL’Y 111, 
111 (2011). 
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IV. THE WATERSHED JUDICIAL ELECTION:  
A NEW CONSIDERATION FOR STARE DECISIS 
Like most states, and unlike the federal system, Wisconsin places the power 
to select judges with the people directly.125  Different states approach the project 
of judicial election differently: some choose retention elections, while others, 
like Wisconsin, prefer candidate-versus-candidate contests.126  Within the latter 
category, some states allow judicial candidates to run with a partisan label on 
the ballot,127 while others, like Wisconsin, keep the election formally 
nonpartisan.128  No matter the particulars, judicial elections often place before 
the community the record of a judge, either as an incumbent or on a lower court, 
and ask the people to pass on that judge’s record.  Thus, in a system with elected 
judges, it is ultimately the people who choose which lawyers will take the 
judicial oath and discharge the duties of the judicial branch.  That is, judicial 
elections ultimately allow the people to judge who should judge them.129  In our 
view, this also means that the truism “elections have consequences”—almost 
absolutely true for the political branches—is true as well, in a qualified way, 
for the judiciary.   
A. The Theory of the Watershed Judicial Election 
We believe that the constitutional choice of Wisconsin to select judges by 
direct elections should influence how the Wisconsin Supreme Court conceives 
of the legal doctrine of stare decisis.  Specifically, we propose that the weight 
of stare decisis ascribed to a particular decision could depend on public opinion 
as expressed in watershed judicial elections.  That is, we believe it is appropriate 
for the court to take the people’s judgment, as expressed in a watershed judicial 
election, into account when ascribing precedential value to pre-watershed cases.  
 
125. WIS. CONST. art. VII, §§ 4–5, 7; Williams–Yulee v. Fla. Bar, 135 S. Ct. 1656, 1662 (2015) 
(noting that thirty-nine states elect judges). 
126. Visit http://www.statecourtsguide.com/ [https://perma.cc/FT6J-TFLW] for an interactive 
guide and additional resources for state judicial selection.  For Wisconsin, see Michael Koehler, 
Baseball, Apple Pie and Judicial Elections: An Analysis of the 1967 Wisconsin Supreme Court Race, 
85 MARQ. L. REV. 223, 224 (2001). 
127. For example, Texas, Illinois, and Pennsylvania. JAMES SAMPLE, ADAM SKAGGS, 
JONATHAN BLITZER & LINDA CASEY, THE NEW POLITICS OF JUDICIAL ELECTIONS 2000–2009 
(Charles Hall ed. 2010), 
http://www.brennancenter.org/sites/default/files/legacy/New%20Politics%20PDF.pdf 
[https://perma.cc/Q8Z6-QGNG]. 
128. Koehler, supra note 126, at 225. 
129. Accord Gabler v. Crime Victims Rights Bd., 2017 WI 67, ¶ 53 n.20, 376 Wis. 2d 147, 897 
N.W.2d 384 (“Wisconsin judges are . . . elected to exercise [a] portion of the sovereign power” of the 
government.). 
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So, when Wisconsin experiences a watershed judicial election to seat a justice 
on the Wisconsin Supreme Court, the pre-watershed decisions of the court 
should no longer receive stare decisis effect when occasion arises for the court 
to reconsider those decisions.  Thus, in our view, stare decisis would operate 
differently some of the time in a judicial system with publicly elected judges, 
like Wisconsin’s, as opposed to a system with appointed judges, like the federal 
system.130 
Importantly, the watershed-judicial-election theory does not mean that 
elected justices are always justified, full-stop, in overturning pre-watershed 
precedent—even unpopular pre-watershed precedent.  All justices in Wisconsin 
must “take and subscribe [the] oath . . . to support the constitution of the United 
States and the constitution of the state of Wisconsin and faithfully discharge the 
duties of [the judicial branch].”131  Those duties, of course, are to faithfully “say 
what the law is”132 without being “swayed by partisan interests, public clamor 
or fear of criticism.”133  Rather, under our theory, the justices have more 
justification to reconsider anew pre-watershed opinions.  If the unpopular 
judicial decision is correct on the merits—not simply left undisturbed because 
of stare decisis—then the judicial oath would require the elected judges to 
affirm the opinion.  For the same reason, the watershed-judicial-election theory 
does not justify justices or judicial candidates engaging in inappropriate 
political activity,134 bending their attitudes towards cases or broad legal issues 
to the whims of the electorate,135 or making promises as to the resolution of 
particular cases that could come before them.136  Each of those vices would also 
 
130. Since federal judges do not face election, they do not have to evaluate questions of precedent 
in relation to the sovereignty of voters in the same way. 
131. E.g., WIS. CONST. art. IV, § 28. 
132. Gabler, 2017 WI 67, ¶ 37 (quoting Marbury v. Madison, 5 U.S. (1 Cranch) 137 (1803)). 
133. WIS. SUP. CT. R. 60.04(b). 
134. See id. 60.06(2). 
135. Williams–Yulee v. Fla. Bar, 135 S. Ct. 1656, 1667 (2015).  Thus, our theory does not 
undermine the principle that “judges, particularly elected judges, must always guard against allowing 
popular pressures to influence their judgment.” Gabler, 2017 WI 67, ¶ 54.  A solemn expression of the 
people’s views through a watershed judicial election, however, is quite different than “popular 
pressures.”  Neither should influence a judge to change his views on the legal merits of a case.  Yet the 
former may justify the Wisconsin Supreme Court ignoring stare decisis to reconsider the legal merits 
of a prior case. 
136. WIS. SUP. CT. R. 60.06(3)(b) cmt. (“A judge or candidate for judicial office may not, while 
a proceeding is pending or impending in the court to which selection is sought, make any public 
comment that may reasonably be viewed as committing the judge, judge-elect or candidate to a 
particular case outcome.”); see Vikram David Amar, Why Did Justice Scalia Decline to Participate in 
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interfere with the judicial duty to “say what the law is,” whether a watershed 
judicial election has occurred or not. 
While we believe the theory that watershed judicial elections in Wisconsin 
should influence stare decisis is unique, the broader point that judicial elections 
should have some formal influence on the law is not.  This position has been 
advanced in an individual writing by Chief Justice Roggensack, by the 
Wisconsin Supreme Court’s lead opinion in Tetra Tech and, in a way, by Justice 
Scalia. 
Chief Justice Roggensack.  Over a decade ago, and in the pages of this 
journal, then-Justice Patience Roggensack powerfully criticized the great-
weight deference doctrine for agencies, which had required the Wisconsin 
Supreme Court to affirm “an agency’s conclusion of law . . . even if the court 
[had] decide[d] that an alternate conclusion [was] more reasonable.”137  In 
support of her criticism, then-Justice Roggensack “suggest[ed] that because the 
Wisconsin Supreme Court’s members were elected to decide what the law is,” 
the court’s use of decision-avoidance doctrines like great-weight deference—
which shift the court’s law-declaring function to unelected agency 
bureaucrats—should be “re-examined.”138  The people elect the justices of the 
Wisconsin Supreme Court “to review the decisions of other tribunals and to 
determine whether a fair decision under the applicable rule of law was made,” 
using and “applying [their own] collective knowledge.”139  But if the court 
instead defers in its law-declaring power to unelected officials, then “it avoids 
the real work of appellate decision making: explaining to the public why the 
application of the law to the facts of the case resulted in the court’s decision 
and why that result is fair under the law.”140  In short, the fact that Wisconsin 
justices are elected should influence the court’s decision to retain a particular 
legal doctrine. 
 
the “One Nation Under God” Case? Recusal Decisions and When they Should, and Should Not, Be 
Required, FINDLAW (Oct. 31, 2003), https://supreme.findlaw.com/legal-commentary/why-did-justice-
scalia-decline-to-participate-in-the-one-nation-under-god-case.html [https://perma.cc/WRH4-QA5R]; 
Kermit Roosevelt, Ways a Judge Should, and Should Not, Be Impartial, N.Y. TIMES: ROOM FOR 
DEBATE (May 17, 2016, 9:43 PM), https://www.nytimes.com/roomfordebate/2013/11/03/judges-
appearance-of-impartiality/ways-a-judge-should-and-should-not-be-impartial [https://perma.cc/S94N-
J9ZL] (stating that the canon that judges should not make commitments on cases likely to come before 
them must be contextualized with the reality that we want intelligent, thoughtful judges with informed 
views about the law). 
137. Patience Drake Roggensack, Elected to Decide: Is the Decision-Avoidance Doctrine of 
Great Weight Deference Appropriate in this Court of Last Resort?, 89 MARQ. L. REV. 541, 547 (2006). 
138. Id. at 542. 
139. Id. at 560. 
140. Id. 
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The Tetra Tech Lead Opinion.  In Tetra Tech, the Wisconsin Supreme Court 
vindicated then-Justice Roggensack’s theory and expressly relied on her article, 
Elected to Decide, described immediately above, to strike down the great-
weight deference doctrine.141  The lead opinion, tracking then-Justice 
Roggensack, stated that great-weight deference is erroneous because “it 
privileges unelected executive-branch employees over those the people of 
Wisconsin elected to resolve questions of law.”142  So, because the justices are 
elected, this provides justification for them to reconsider, and ultimately 
overrule, some legal doctrine. 
Justice Scalia.  In a 1994 address to the Supreme Court Historical Society 
on dissenting opinions, Justice Scalia concluded that the U.S. Supreme Court’s 
practice of writing separate opinions led to the highly controversial judicial-
nomination process commonly seen today.143  Now, “the appointment of [a] 
new justice becomes something of a plebiscite upon the meaning of the 
Constitution in general . . . in effect giving the majority the power to prescribe 
the meaning of an instrument designed to restrain the majority.”144  Yet Justice 
Scalia “confess[ed] not to be quite as aghast at this consequence” as others may 
be; rather, it seemed to him “a tolerable, and indeed perhaps a necessary, check 
upon the power of the Court. . . .”145  Because of the difficulty of enacting a 
constitutional amendment, Justice Scalia noted, “the people . . . achiev[ing] 
correction of what they deem to be erroneous constitutional decisions through 
the appointment process” is “not inappropriate.”146 
These three views—then-Justice Roggensack’s, the Wisconsin Supreme 
Court’s, and Justice Scalia’s—provide the theoretical foundation for our theory 
of the watershed judicial election.  The people elect the justices of the 
Wisconsin Supreme Court to “say what the law is.”147  When that court defers 
 
141. Tetra Tech EC, Inc., v. Wis. Dep’t of Revenue, 2018 WI 75, ¶ 18, 382 Wis. 2d 496, 914  
N.W.2d 21 (praising then-Justice Roggensack for doing “yeoman’s work in tracing the development 
and effect of this doctrine”). 
142. Tetra Tech, 2018 WI 75, ¶ 57 (citing Roggensack, supra note 137) (emphasis added).  
143. ANTONIN SCALIA, SCALIA SPEAKS: REFLECTIONS ON LAW, FAITH, AND LIFE WELL LIVED 
280 (Christopher J. Scalia & Edward Whelan eds., 2017), first published as Antonin Scalia, The 
Dissenting Opinion, 1994 J. SUP. CT. HIST. 33. 
144. Id. at 280–81. 
145. Id. at 281. 
146. Id. (emphasis added) (although ultimately concluding that this “corrective [measure] has 
been overused in recent years”). 
147. Accord Gabler v. Crime Victims Rights Bd., 2017 WI 67, ¶ 37, 376 Wis. 2d 147, 897 
N.W.2d 384 (quoting Marbury v. Madison, 5 U.S. (1 Cranch) 137 (1803)). 
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via stare decisis to the incorrect decisions of its past, the court deprives the 
people in some way of their chosen arbiters.148  While that deprivation may 
perhaps be countenanced under normal circumstances, since the justices of the 
past were chosen by the public of the past, a watershed election is different: it 
leaves no doubt that the people desire a “correction of what they deem to be 
erroneous . . . decisions.”149 
Further, so long as stare decisis is ultimately a “principle of policy” for the 
benefit of the public,150 it is fitting for elected justices to consider a formal 
expression of the public’s views—a watershed judicial election—when 
deciding stare decisis questions.  Stated differently, in a system with elected 
judges, stare decisis may be viewed as a public right: the right to a reliable, 
stable system of judicial precedent, and the right for decisions to be left 
undisturbed by the judiciary absent special circumstances.  This right, like 
almost all rights, may be alienated by the bearer at will.  Thus, if the public 
were to disclaim its reliance interests in a particular decision, then there would 
be little reason for a justice to adhere to that decision.  A watershed judicial 
election is, in our view, the public making such a disclaimer. 
Finally, we think the watershed-judicial-election theory successfully avoids 
the same indeterminacy pitfalls that plague traditional stare decisis.  While 
defining what a watershed judicial election is in the abstract may be difficult—
and we hesitate to attempt to provide a comprehensive definition here—it 
should not be too difficult to identify watershed elections in reality.  Further, 
once a court decides that a previous election is indeed watershed, that 
determination suffices to negate the stare decisis effect of all cases which the 
public passed on during the watershed election.  So, even looking at the simple 
number of necessary applications alone, the watershed-judicial-election theory 
improves upon the predictability of stare decisis. 
B. Defining a “Watershed Judicial Election,” Primarily by Way of a Recent 
Judicial Election in Wisconsin 
To better conceptualize the watershed-judicial-election theory, we will 
recount a recent judicial election from Wisconsin that we believe should qualify 
 
148. Accord State v. Lynch, 2016 WI 66, ¶ 39 n.17, 371 Wis. 2d 1, 885 N.W.2d 89 (Gableman, 
J., lead op.) (“[C]ourts have continued to blindly adhere to poorly reasoned cases solely because they 
have felt compelled to do so. . . .  We cannot continue to pass the buck.  We must roll up our sleeves 
and dig into the law.  Interpreting the Constitution is, after all, the ultimate responsibility of this 
court.”). 
149. SCALIA, supra note 143, at 281. 
150. See Johnson Controls, Inc. v. Emp’rs Ins. of Wausau, 2003 WI 108, ¶ 97, 264 Wis. 2d 60, 
665 N.W.2d 257. 
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as “watershed.”  Historically, Wisconsin judicial elections attracted little 
fanfare.  One pundit rehearsed an old joke that supreme court races were like 
“playing a game of checkers by mail.”151  Until recently, an incumbent had not 
lost reelection in over four decades.152  Yet, the spring 2008 election to the 
Wisconsin Supreme Court was not the typical sleepy judicial race.153   
Leading up to the 2008 election, the public was fully engaged on the issues 
concerning the court.  An open seat the previous year had prompted a race that 
was unusually expensive and negative,154 reflecting the fact that the entire state 
was in conversation around the court’s new direction that had begun in its 2004 
term.  Justice Louis Butler had been appointed in 2004 by Democratic Governor 
Jim Doyle to a vacant seat on the court created by the elevation of Justice Diane 
S. Sykes to the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit.155  Justice 
Butler’s appointment, along with the jurisprudential shift of previously 
conservative-leaning Justice N. Patrick Crooks, led to a 4–3 non-
originalist/purposivist majority on the court.156  This new majority then began 
rendering sweeping, transformative decisions157—often quite detached from 
originalist/textualist principles—which prompted significant debate across 
 
151. Katelyn Ferral, As Wisconsin’s Supreme Court Reaches New Levels of Discord, Voters 
Navigate Another Heated Election, CAP. TIMES (Mar. 30, 2016), 
https://madison.com/ct/news/local/govt-and-politics/as-wisconsin-s-supreme-court-reaches-new-
levels-of-discord/article_5f2f4d79-29d6-5603-9587-8e1518dd9d38.html [https://perma.cc/ZDU3-
B58Z].  
152. Dee J. Hall, Gableman Wins Supreme Court Race, CHIPPEWA HERALD (Apr. 2, 2008), 
https://chippewa.com/news/gableman-wins-supreme-court-race/article_572804b4-4352-53c4-a15b-
627dc9608ce5.html [https://perma.cc/UX8D-29VN]. 
153. See Shawn Johnson, For Contentious Supreme Court Race, Stage Was Set a Decade Ago, 
WIS. PUB. RADIO (Apr. 2, 2018, 9:04 AM), https://www.wpr.org/contentious-supreme-court-race-
stage-was-set-decade-ago [https://perma.cc/3DDX-S8BJ].  
154. See id. 
155. Supreme Shift, ISTHMUS (Dec. 8, 2005), https://isthmus.com/archive/from-the-
archives/state-highest-court-is-evolving-in-ways-that-hearten-convicts-and-give-fits-to-business-
groups/ [https://perma.cc/ZP4G-KQGC]. 
156. Id. 
157. See Ferdon v. Wis. Patients Comp. Fund, 2005 WI 125, 284 Wis. 2d 573, 701 N.W.2d 440; 
Thomas ex rel. Gramling v. Mallett, 2005 WI 129, 285 Wis. 2d 236, 701 N.W.2d 523; State v. Knapp, 
2005 WI 127, 285 Wis. 2d 86, 700 N.W.2d 899; State v. Dubose, 2005 WI 126, 285 Wis. 2d 143, 699 
N.W.2d 582; In re Jerrell C.J., 2005 WI 105, 283 Wis. 2d 145, 699 N.W.2d 110. 
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Wisconsin.  Newspapers,158 law reviews,159 think tanks,160 stakeholder 
groups161—all featured in-depth reporting and commentary on the court’s new 
direction, far beyond the attention normally paid to the third branch.  Moreover, 
this public discussion had a distinctly jurisprudential cast.  People were actually 
talking about cases—as the sub-head in one newsmagazine put it, “Supreme 
shift: The state’s highest court is evolving in ways that hearten convicts and 
give fits to business groups.”162 
After some years, this Wisconsin conversation transitioned from a general 
discussion about the court’s direction to the specific Wisconsin Supreme Court 
contest between Justice Butler and his challenger, Michael Gableman, a little-
known northern Wisconsin trial-court judge from a small county.163  
Advertising spending in the race set a new record,164 and a national advocacy 
group concluded it was “the most expensive and hardest fought race” nationally 
of its type.165  Most importantly for our purposes, the election put the questions 
around judicial philosophy squarely before the voters; as one newspaper 
reported: 
Michael Gableman [characterized] his campaign against 
 
158. Michael B. Brennan, Are Courts Becoming Too Activist?, MILWAUKEE J. SENTINEL, Oct. 
2, 2005, at 1J; David Ziemer, Crooks Emerges as Court’s Key Swing Vote, WIS. L.J. (Aug. 24, 2005), 
https://wislawjournal.com/2005/08/24/crooks-emerges-as-courtrsquos-key-swing-vote/ 
[https://perma.cc/9LYX-RKY8]; Alabama North, WALL STREET J. (Aug. 9, 2005), 
https://www.wsj.com/articles/SB112354398666108112 [https://perma.cc/YEK4-E2W9]. 
159. Lynn Adelman & Shelley Fite, Exercising Judicial Power: A Response to the Wisconsin 
Supreme Court’s Critics, 91 MARQ. L. REV. 425, 425 (2007); Diane S. Sykes, Reflections on the 
Wisconsin Supreme Court, 89 MARQ. L. REV. 723, 725–26 (2006); Donald G. Gifford, The Death of 
Causation: Mass Products Torts’ Incomplete Incorporation of Social Welfare Principles, 41 WAKE 
FOREST L. REV. 943, 985 (2006). 
160. RICK ESENBERG, A COURT UNBOUND? THE RECENT JURISPRUDENCE OF THE WISCONSIN 
SUPREME COURT (2007), https://fedsoc.org/commentary/publications/a-court-unbound-the-recent-
jurisprudence-of-the-wisconsin-supreme-court [https://perma.cc/79A7-KNXM]; Rick Esenberg, 
Activist vs. Restraint: Where is Wisconsin’s Court Headed?, WIS. INT., Fall 2007, at 15, 15; Diane S. 
Sykes, A New Direction for the Wisconsin Supreme Court, WIS. INT., Fall 2007, at 11, 11. 
161.  Jim Hough, Liability Reform Summary 2005–2006, WIS. DEF. COUNS., Spring 2006, 
https://www.wdc-online.org/wdc-journal/archived-editions/liability-reform-summary-2005-2006 
[https://perma.cc/ZLR8-QC9J]; Tom Still, Business Liability Law Complaints Grow with State 
Supreme Court Decisions, WIS. TECH. COUNCIL (Aug. 18, 2005),  
https://wisconsintechnologycouncil.com/business-liability-law-complaints-grow-with-state-supreme-
court-decisions/ [https://perma.cc/8KFK-XUMF]. 
162. Supreme Shift, supra note 155. 
163. See Hall, supra note 152. 
164. Nasty Supreme Court Race Costs Record $6 Million, WIS. DEMOCRACY CAMPAIGN (July 
22, 2008), http://www.wisdc.org/pr072208.php [https://perma.cc/Q4PT-7UEE]. 
165. SAMPLE, SKAGGS, BLITZER & CASEY, supra note 127, at 32.  
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Wisconsin Supreme Court Justice Louis Butler as one of very 
sharp contrasts in their backgrounds and judicial philosophies. 
The Burnett County Circuit Court judge describes himself as a 
judicial conservative and Butler as a judicial activist.  
Gableman also says he was a longtime prosecutor, while Butler 
was a longtime defense attorney.   
Butler says what Gableman really means was that he disagrees 
with the opinions of the state’s high court.166 
In the end, for the first time in decades, the voters selected a challenger over an 
incumbent, and Judge Michael Gableman became the newest justice with a seat 
on the state’s high court.167  That type of an election seems to us to be a 
watershed.168 
C. The Takeaway 
A number of the issues from the Justice Butler era have returned to the 
Wisconsin Supreme Court in the decade since the Justice Gableman election, 
and certain high-profile issues have been overturned by the new, 
originalist/textualist majority.169  Professor Alan Ball of Marquette University 
has noted that the Gableman-for-Butler change led to a marked dedication to 
 
166. Gableman Describes Supreme Court Race as One of Stark Contrasts, TWIN CITIES 
PIONEER PRESS (Mar. 12, 2008, 1:50 PM, updated Nov. 13, 2015, 6:54 PM), 
https://www.twincities.com/2008/03/12/gableman-describes-supreme-court-race-as-one-of-stark-
contrasts/ [https://perma.cc/NYK7-TCJP]. 
167. Hall, supra note 152.  
168. We note in passing two other potential watershed elections: In 1986, the people of 
California chose not to retain three justices of the California Supreme Court, led by Chief Justice Rose 
Bird, over their views on the death penalty. B. Michael Dann & Randall M. Hansen, Judicial Retention 
Elections, 34 LOY. L.A. L. REV. 1429, 1431–33 (2001) (discussing the non-retention of Chief Justice 
Rose Bird and her colleagues).  And in 2010 the people of Iowa chose not to retain three justices of the 
Iowa Supreme Court who had taken broad views of the judicial power to create rights under the state 
constitution. A. G. Sulzberger, Ouster of Iowa Judges Sends Signal to Bench, N.Y. TIMES (Nov. 3, 
2010), https://www.nytimes.com/2010/11/04/us/politics/04judges.html [https://perma.cc/6XJZ-
K7JB].  These sorts of elections, where the judicial issues are put squarely before the people, seem to 
us to qualify as watershed moments. 
169. See, e.g., State v. Denny, 2017 WI 17, ¶ 69, 373 Wis. 2d 390, 891 N.W.2d 144 (overturning 
State v. Moran, 2005 WI 115, 284 Wis. 2d 24, 700 N.W.2d 884); Mayo v. Wis. Injured Patients & 
Families Comp. Fund, 2018 WI 78, ¶ 2, 383 Wis. 2d 1, 914 N.W.2d 678 (overturning Ferdon ex rel. 
Petrucelli v. Wis. Patients Comp. Fund, 2005 WI 125, 284 Wis. 2d 573, 701 N.W.2d 440). 
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precedent by the court’s purposivists/non-originalists and a less deferential 
attitude toward precedent by the court’s originalist/textualists.170 
If the Justice Gableman election was a watershed judicial election—as we 
argue—then the originalist/textualist justices’ approach is entirely appropriate, 
even if their application of stare decisis is wanting under a traditional view, 
precisely because Wisconsin judges are elected.  When the voters forthrightly 
choose to reject an incumbent justice based on his philosophy, we find it 
entirely reasonable to vacate the precedential value of the decisions that 
stemmed from that philosophy.171  Of course, as we noted above, in all cases, 
the judicial oath requires the justices to “say what the law is,” so if an unpopular 
pre-watershed decision is nevertheless legally correct, it must be affirmed.172  
Thus, the originalist/textualist justices’ approach identified by Professor Ball is 
only justified to the extent they believe in good faith that the prior decisions 
were wrong on the merits. 
V. ADDRESSING QUESTIONS OF “FIRST IMPRESSION” IN OLD DOCTRINES 
Our watershed-judicial-election theory is one justification for the 
Wisconsin Supreme Court to reconsider precedent free from the constraints of 
stare decisis.  Our second, perhaps more conventional theory justifying the 
court avoiding stare decisis might be called the “question of first impression 
exception” to stare decisis. 
Courts are often called upon in a particular case to address a legal question 
from a single perspective—for example, from the view of assuming the 
correctness of prior settled doctrine.173  Yet, the ultimate correctness of a court’s 
answer to such a question depends upon multiple perspectives: doctrinal, 
statutory, and constitutional.  But depending on how litigants frame the 
 
170. Alan Ball, Is Stare Decisis Dead?, SCOWSTATS (Mar. 28, 2017), 
http://www.scowstats.com/2017/03/28/is-stare-decisis-dead/ [https://perma.cc/N4VY-XRX2]. 
171. Legal academics might find in this proposition an echo of Professor Bruce Ackerman’s 
“constitutional moments” theory.  We disclaim his theory though we understand the similarity. 
172. Before the Butler–Gableman contest, the last time an incumbent justice lost reelection to 
the Wisconsin Supreme Court was Chief Justice George Currie in 1967.  Chief Justice Currie had voted 
to allow the Milwaukee Braves to move to Atlanta.  He then lost in an election characterized as a 
referendum on that decision.  That referendum does not mean Chief Justice Currie’s original decision 
was legally incorrect or that under our suggested analysis the court should have automatically overruled 
its previous holding.  Sometimes judges must do unpopular things to vindicate the rights of the minority 
against the majority, or to uphold the contracts of corporations.  That the people may throw a judge out 
of office for reaching the legally correct, but politically unpopular decision may be, to put it bluntly, 
just the way the world works. See Koehler, supra note 126, at 223–24. 
173. See Citizens United v. Fed. Election Comm’n, 558 U.S. 310, 377 (2010); Lawrence v. 
Texas, 539 U.S. 558, 577 (2003). 
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particular legal questions coming before a court, the court may consider and 
reconsider an issue in several different cases without ever answering a 
dispositive doctrinal, statutory, or constitutional question.174 
When a court does confront a legal issue it has addressed previously from 
a different perspective, traditional stare decisis doctrine requires the court to 
still give stare decisis effect to that precedent, even though the specific question 
at is one of first impression.  So, for example, the Wisconsin Supreme Court 
engaged in a stare decisis analysis before overruling the agency-deference 
doctrine under a separation-of-powers rationale, although none of the court’s 
prior agency-deference decisions had considered that specific question 
before.175  It was, in the court’s words, a question of “first impression.”176  Yet 
for a court to defer, or at least to consider whether to defer, to a previous 
decision on a question of first impression is in a way paradoxical.  And when 
this paradoxical stare decisis effect is given in a case with a constitutional 
question of first impression, it arguably makes judicial precedent more 
fundamental than the Constitution. 
To avoid that troubling result, we propose a “question of first impression” 
exception to stare decisis.  Under this “exception,” the Wisconsin Supreme 
Court would be justified in reconsidering precedent, without regard to stare 
decisis, if (1) the precedent may violate a more fundamental principle of law—
say, for example, the original meaning of a provision of the Wisconsin 
Constitution—and (2) the potential violation is one of “first impression.”  Thus, 
under this “exception,” the court would be justified in overturning prior 
precedent, based upon constitutional arguments of first impression, without 
first engaging in stare decisis analysis.  
Granting stare decisis effect on questions of first impression found within 
settled doctrine does not meaningfully further the purposes of stare decisis, at 
least when those questions are constitutional questions.  The rule of law—stare 
decisis’ main end—is not advanced: the constitution is foundational law, thus 
deferring to incorrect judicial precedent on a novel question subverts that order.  
Stability and reliance are not well-advanced for a similar reason.  If the proper 
application of the constitution may be perverted simply by accident of parties’ 
litigation strategies, then the people’s trust in the constitution as the bedrock 
charter of the state will be eroded.  The benefits of decentralized-decision 
 
174. This may especially be true when the court employs doctrines like constitutional 
avoidance, which intentionally pushes off deciding constitutional questions whenever possible. 
175. Tetra Tech EC, Inc., v. Wis. Dep’t of Revenue, 2018 WI 75, ¶ 42, 382 Wis. 2d 496, 914 
N.W.2d 21. 
176. Id. 
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making are also absent, given that, by definition, jurists of the past have not 
weighed in on questions of first impression.  As for efficiency, we will concede 
the question-of-first-impression exception cuts against it, but submit that this 
end by itself could never justify stare decisis. 
As with our watershed-judicial-election theory, the question-of-first-
impression exception is not unknown in the law.  Arguably, as-applied 
constitutional challenges are a rough form of the doctrine.  Such challenges 
break down a larger question, facial constitutionality, into multiple smaller 
questions, constitutionality as applied to a specific subset.  In this way, a court 
may declare a law unconstitutional as applied to one subset in case one, yet 
constitutional as applied to another subset in case two, without granting stare 
decisis effect to case one.  In other words, as-applied constitutional challenges 
create questions of first impression within a larger body of precedent without 
bringing in stare decisis.  So, for example, the U.S. Supreme Court held that the 
federal Religious Freedom Restoration Act was unconstitutional as applied to 
the states in City of Boerne v. Flores.177  Yet the Court held it constitutional as 
applied to the federal government in both Burwell v. Hobby Lobby Stores, 
Inc.,178 and Gonzales v. O Centro,179 with of course no mention of the need to 
grant stare decisis effect to City of Boerne.   
The jurisprudence of Justice Thomas provides a more direct comparison.  
In Gonzalez v. Carhart, which upheld the federal partial-birth abortion ban 
against a constitutional right-to-privacy challenge, Justice Thomas 
concurred.180  He wrote separately, however, noting, “whether the Partial-Birth 
Abortion Ban Act of 2013 constitutes a permissible exercise of Congress’ 
power under the Commerce Clause is not before the Court.  The parties did not 
raise or brief that issue; it is outside the question presented; and the lower courts 
did not address it.”181  This strongly implies that, if the Court were to look at 
the statute through a Commerce Clause lens, rather than a right-to-privacy lens, 
Justice Thomas would not feel bound to uphold again the Act, simply because 
of the purported stare decisis effect of Carhart.  That is, because the question 
before the Court would be different and would require a different 
analysis, Gonzalez would be entitled to no stare decisis deference.  A decision 
 
177. 521 U.S. 507, 535 (1997) (concluding that the statute exceeded Congress’s Fourteenth 
Amendment, Section Five power). 
178. 134 S. Ct. 2751, 2761 (2014). 
179. 546 U.S. 418, 424 (2006). 
180. 550 U.S. 124, 168–69 (2007). 
181. Id. at 169 (Thomas, J., concurring).   
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on one question does not bind the Court as to future different questions about 
the same underlying topic.182   
Finally, the Tetra Tech lead opinion’s approach to precedent supports the 
“question of first impression exception” (although it tackles a body of doctrine 
rather than an individual holding).  There, Justice Kelly states that, although the 
courts have upheld and applied deference to administrative agencies for many 
years as a matter of common law, it was a question of “first impression” 
whether that deference comported with the constitutional separation-of-powers 
principle.183  It then resolved the question of stare decisis in a few paragraphs, 
a perhaps surprising approach if the court had conceived of the doctrine in the 
traditional way.  Yet, the court, Justice Kelly said, owed no obeisance to 
precedence because the previous cases did not consider the separation-of-
powers question now before the court—same underlying issue, but different 
question.  Thus, the court could take a practice that it had upheld in one context 
and strike down the practice when considered in a different context, just as 
Justice Thomas could uphold the partial-birth abortion statute in the Fourteenth 
Amendment context, but hold open the possibility of striking the same statute 
down in the Commerce Clause context if presented with the question in a future 
case. 
We anticipate the distinction will become more prevalent and more 
apparent in future cases because of the trends we discussed in Part II, above.  
As advocates apply textualist and originalist methodologies for the first time to 
decades-old doctrines, there will be more “questions of first impression” about 
issues or provisions previously considered.  Though administrative deference 
cases had percolated through the courts of Wisconsin for decades, Tetra Tech 
was genuinely the first case when the separation-of-powers question was 
squarely before the court.184  We expect that the originalism-focused litigants 
 
182. Justice Thomas also took this approach in Troxel v. Granville, which considered the 
constitutionality, under the substantive-due-process doctrine, of statutes authorizing grandparents to 
obtain visitation rights to their grandchildren. 530 U.S. 57, 65–66 (2000).  Justice Thomas concurred 
in the judgment that such a statute was unconstitutional and wrote separately to note that “neither party 
has argued that our substantive due process cases were wrongly decided and that the original 
understanding of the Due Process Clause precludes judicial enforcement of unenumerated rights under 
that constitutional provision.” Id. at 80 (Thomas, J., concurring in the judgment).  So, he would “leave 
the resolution of that issue for another day.” Id. 
183. Tetra Tech EC, Inc., v. Wis. Dep’t of Revenue, 2018 WI 75, ¶ 42, 382 Wis. 2d 496, 914 
N.W.2d 21.  
184. It had been touched on elsewhere in separate opinions: Operton v. Labor & Indus. Review 
Comm’n, 2017 WI 46, ¶¶ 73–80, 375 Wis. 2d 1, 894 N.W.2d 426 (R.G. Bradley, J., concurring); 
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will bring cases that ask these sorts of “first principles” questions of long-
standing doctrines for the first time.185   
VI. CONCLUSION 
Thus we come to the question that Professor Alan Ball of Marquette 
University asked in a provocative post for his SCOWStat blog: “Is Stare Decisis 
Dead?”186 Writing in March 2017, he uses the court’s then-recent decision in 
State v. Denny  as a launching point to analyze forty-nine decisions from the 
past twenty terms wherein at least one justice substantively invoked the doctrine 
in his or her opinion.  He suggests that there has been a “liberal–conservative 
role reversal on stare decisis,” that the purposivists/non-originalist justices have 
become defenders of judicial restraint, while the originalist/textualist justices 
have essentially become judicial activists “nullify[ing] or alter[ing] previous 
decisions as [they] saw fit.”187  While we have argued that stare decisis allows 
for near-limitless, individualized judicial discretion, we believe that Professor 
Ball’s conclusion that the originalist/textualist justices are just acting “at will” 
is overly simplified, failing to give appropriate credence to these justices’ 
thoughtful attempts to apply the doctrine.  Further, given that our two theories 
described above cannot completely displace stare decisis, we cannot say that 
stare decisis is dead.  And while we have identified important downsides of the 
doctrine—that it leaves judges with near-limitless discretion—we do recognize 
that some conception of stare decisis is foundational to the rule of law.   
 
DaimlerChrysler v. Labor & Indus. Review Comm’n, 2007 WI 15, ¶ 45, 299 Wis. 2d 1, 727 N.W.2d 
311 (Roggensack, J., dissenting); Racine Harley–Davidson, Inc. v. Wis. Div. of Hearing & Appeals, 
2006 WI 86, ¶¶ 104–113, 292 Wis. 2d 549, 717 N.W.2d 184 (Roggensack, J., concurring); Hilton v. 
Dep’t of Nat. Res., 2006 WI 84, ¶¶ 53–67, 293 Wis. 2d 1, 717 N.W.2d 166 (Prosser, J., concurring). 
185. A broader reading of the “new questions of old doctrines” theory treads closer to questions 
of methodology: what happens when a court faces a case concerning a constitutional or statutory 
provision that has long been interpreted a certain way, but the tools of a particular modern judicial 
methodology (i.e., textualism or originalism) have never been applied to that clause.  This eventually 
becomes simply the question, “What’s an originalist to do with non-originalist precedent?,” a topic 
explored at length elsewhere, such as Lee J. Strang, An Originalist Theory of Precedent: Originalism, 
Nonoriginalist Precedent, and the Common Good, 36 N.M. L. REV. 419, 420 (2006), and beyond our 
scope.   
We note only that Wisconsin courts have achieved methodological consensus for an originalist reading 
of non-constitutional texts, see Suhr, supra note 92, at 969–70, 994–95, and at least some justices are 
open to revisiting the court’s method for constitutional texts to establish an expectation of textualism 
there as well. See Coyne v. Walker, 2016 WI 38, ¶ 249 n.2, 368 Wis. 2d 444, 879 N.W.2d 606 (Ziegler, 
J., dissenting) (expressing “willing[ness] to reexamine the methodology this court currently employs 
when interpreting constitutional text.”). 
186. Ball, supra note 170. 
187. Id. 
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That said, our two theories do eliminate stare decisis’ near-limitless 
discretion in some classes of cases, with the upshot that the justices may avoid 
Professor Ball’s line of criticism, even as they reconsider more decisions.  
Indeed, looking generally at the jurisprudence of the justices, these proposals 
add substantial explanatory power: Chief Justice Roggensack and Justice 
Ziegler generally adopt an institutionalist position, willing to overturn 
precedent, yet also deferential to traditional notions of stare decisis.188  Our 
proposed theory of watershed-judicial elections, defending the reversal of the 
Justice Butler-era cases, seems especially helpful in explaining these justices’ 
jurisprudence.  Justices Rebecca Bradley and Kelly are generally more open to 
reconsidering long-established doctrines in the new light of originalist or 
textualist analysis.189  Our proposed theory addressing questions of first 
impression seems to explain these justices’ views.  We hope that, by developing 
these two theories here, we may assist the justices in more effectively skirting 
the imbroglio of stare decisis in these two types of cases.   
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
188. See id. 
189. See, e.g., Porter v. State, 2018 WI 79, ¶ 74, 382 Wis. 2d 697, 913 N.W.2d 842 (R.G. Bradley 
& Kelly, JJ., dissenting) (questioning traditional understandings of substantive due process); Mayo v. 
Wis. Injured Patients & Families Comp. Fund, 2018 WI 78, ¶¶ 68–70, 73–91, 383 Wis. 2d 1, 914 
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